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SYNOPSES OF PAST ARTICLES IN THE MONTANA LAW
REVIEW DISCUSSING THE 1972 MONTANA
CONSTITUTION (1972-2009)
In advance of the 2010 vote on whether a constitutional convention
should be called in Montana, the editors and staff have collected and synop-
sized all articles from the Montana Law Review published between 1972
and 2009 that discuss the Montana Constitution. We hope this collection
will be a useful resource for researchers, practitioners, and citizens alike.
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The Legislative Assembly in a Modem Montana Constitution'-
Ellis Waldron
This article explores the constitutional framework for the Montana
Legislative Assembly. The author argues a representative assembly is the
crucial component of a modem state government. The three most important
functions of such a representative assembly are: (1) to review proposals of
law; (2) to regulate state government activity via taxation and public ex-
penditures; and (3) to provide a check against other branches of govern-
ment, particularly the executive. Creation of a legislature that can success-
fully perform these functions requires consideration of structural issues,
such as the size and number of houses, districting, apportionment, fre-
quency of sessions, and compensation. A strong executive is necessary to
balance the growing national bureaucracy, and an independent legislature is
necessary to provide a check on the executive.
Montana's constitutional foundations hinder the Legislative Assembly
from performing these vital functions. In order to create a more flexible
and effective legislative institution, the legislative article should create a
unicameral structure with approximately 75 members (from single member
districts) who meet in January of odd-numbered years. A bipartisan com-
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mission should re-evaluate apportionment each decade. Additionally,
members should earn an annual salary, modest per diem expense reimburse-
ments, and generous travel reimbursements. Finally, the legislative article
should contain language granting traditional legislative immunity and the
power (via statute) to make maximum use of technology.
Constitutional Control of the Montana University System: a Proposed
Revision2-Laurence R. Waldoch
This article analyzes the meaning and effect of Article XI, § 11 of the
1889 Montana Constitution,3 which gives control over the state universities
and educational institutions to the state Board of Education. The provision
is analyzed in light of decisions from other states regarding the control of
state universities. The author argues that the 1889 Constitution failed to
give sufficient authority to the Board of Regents and proposes a revision
that would provide such authority.
As provided in Article XI, § 11, the Board of Regents' "powers and
duties shall be prescribed and regulated by the law . . . ."4 This implies
there will be differences between autonomous universities and those that
are legislatively controlled. The author provides an examination of these
differences, as well as the role and scope of the Board of Regents' fund
disbursement for higher education.
According to the author, delegates of the 1972 Constitutional Conven-
tion should draft a clause that encourages the court to apply factors that
other jurisdictions have used to uphold the constitutionality of statutes af-
fecting regents. The author concludes by proposing an example of such a
clause and argues that the new Constitution must attempt a better balance
between the autonomy of the Board of Regents and reasonable oversight by
the Legislature.
Apportionment: Past to Future5-John Dudis
This article discusses the history of reapportionment (attempts to
change the way voting districts are delineated) in America politics and sug-
gests a reapportionment plan for Montana to adopt. The article begins by
tracing the history of the judiciary's refusal to consider reapportionment.
Then, the author cites several cases from the U.S. Supreme Court finding
2. Laurence R. Waldoch, Constitutional Control of the Montana University System: A Proposed
Revision, 33 Mont. L. Rev. 76 (1972).
3. Mont. Const. art. XI, § 11 (1889).
4. Id. at art. XI, § 11.
5. John Dudis, Apportionment: Past to Future, 33 Mont. L. Rev. 101 (1972).
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states' reapportionment plans unconstitutional, culminating with Baker v.
Carr.6
The article goes on to discuss the states' failed legislative attempts to
respond to the Supreme Court's rulings. The author proposes possible op-
tions for how states can reapportion voting districts, including allowing in-
dividual state legislatures to reapportion themselves, simple state legislative
inaction, and calling state constitutional conventions. The author then dis-
cusses reapportionment in Montana, alluding to various unsuccessful at-
tempts to pass legislation that would have reformed reapportionment.
When Montana finally passed a bill reforming reapportionment, it was im-
mediately found to be unconstitutional. The Legislature redrafted the bill,
and at the time of the publication of this article, the bill had not yet been
constitutionally adjudicated.
The final section of the article discusses a proposal for the new Mon-
tana Constitution. Suggestions include: Montana adopting a "single" mem-
ber districted system; excluding from the definition of a "population," for-
eign aliens, non-taxable Indians, and servicemen on active duty; and includ-
ing a financial reimbursement provision for commission members to be
enacted through enabling legislation.
Revenue and Taxation in the Montana Constitution: Present and
Proposed&-P. Bruce Harper
This article analyzes difficult and ambiguous fiscal sections of the
1889 Constitution8 in light of judicial decisions construing them. The arti-
cle examines the economic, political, and philosophical factors contributing
to the complexity of the 1889 fiscal provisions. The author contends that
only in closely examining the cases construing the Constitutional provisions
can one sift through the vagaries and find their actual meaning.
The author begins by placing Montana's 1889 Constitution in a class
of documents of that period, stating that it is ambiguous and more con-
cerned with limiting government than achieving positive, constructive
goals. Moving to the Constitution itself, the author first explores the Equal-
ity and Uniformity Clause, 9 then the Classification Clause10 in light of judi-
cial interpretation.
The article then examines the various exemptions to taxation under the
Constitution, including exemptions for public property, local property, and
6. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
7. P. Bruce Harper, Revenue and Taxation in the Montana Constitution: Present and Proposed, 33
Mont. L. Rev. 126 (1972).
8. Mont. Const. art. XI, § 11 (1889).
9. Id. at art. XII, § 1.
10. Id. at art. XII, § 11.
Vol. 71510
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corporate property. The author then briefly examines the remaining fiscal
provisions of Article XII. The article concludes by suggesting that the
drafters of the new Constitution avoid the temptation to place specific and
elaborate fiscal guidelines in the document, leaving the Legislature largely
responsible for such decisions.
Local Government: Old Problems and a New Constitution"-
James D. Moore
This article presents an overview of local government dilemmas, pos-
sible approaches to metropolitan and area-wide problems, and recent consti-
tutional attempts to free local governments from traditional obstacles. The
article focuses on the contention between the emerging centralized state
government and the traditional preference that local matters be governed by
local officials.
The article explores some of the present approaches taken when deal-
ing with the difficulties posed by the contention between state and local
governance. Among these approaches, the author discusses: annexation;
consolidation; extraterritorial powers; intergovernmental agreements and
transfer of functions; special districting; federation; the metropolitan coun-
cil; and establishing a planning agency.
The author then examines the purpose, as well as the most effective
means of drafting a local government provision for the Montana Constitu-
tion. The author then lists factors to be taken into consideration when draft-
ing the local government provision of the Montana Constitution. Finally,
the author provides an example of what he believes to be an appropriate
draft of such a provision.
"Public Trust" as a Constitutional Provision in Montana 12
Bill Leaphart
This article takes the form of a proposal to the Montana Constitutional
Convention. The author begins by stating that because Montana is drafting
a new constitution (in 1972); it is in a unique position to become perhaps
the most progressive state in the field of constitutional guarantees for its
environment. The article suggests that the imputation of the Public Trust
Doctrine into the Montana Constitution is necessary in order to adequately
ensure environmental protection in the future.
11. James D. Moore, Local Government: Old Problems and a New Constitution, 33 Mont. L. Rev.
154 (1972).
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The author begins by examining the origins and history of the Public
Trust Doctrine, starting with its use in Roman and English common law.
The author then follows the development of the Doctrine through the 19th
Century Supreme Court decisions interpreting it. Finally, the author dis-
cusses the Doctrine's use in the 20th Century by Wisconsin and Massachu-
setts courts in protecting their resources.
The author then cites two states, Alaska and Hawaii, which have provi-
sions similar to that which he is proposing. Despite the rarity of states
incorporating the Public Trust Doctrine into their constitutions, the author
advocates for the use of the Doctrine at the constitutional level in Montana.
The author concludes by providing an example of what Montana's constitu-
tional provision should look like.
Montana Water Rights-A New OpportunityI 3-Albert W. Stone
This article explores the Montana Constitution's recognition and con-
firmation of "all existing water rights."14 Specifically, the author discusses
problems associated with confirming and recognizing existing water rights.
In order to create clarity in Montana's water laws, the author suggests the
Legislature needs to focus on making improvements in three areas of the
law. First, there must be a conclusive ascertainment of existing rights be-
cause current water right records are virtually useless. Second, future water
rights must be acquired by permit. According to the author, in addition to
providing for a final determination and adjudication of existing water rights,
newly acquired rights need to be equally definite, certain, and in the public
record. Finally, the administration of water rights should be recognized as
an administrative, rather than a judicial task.
The Montana Law of Valuation in Eminent Domain t5-John F. Sullivan
This article provides an exclusive look at how Montana approaches the
issue of real property valuation in eminent domain proceedings. This arti-
cle only discusses the valuation of real property taken or damaged in con-
demnation. Generally, the following four topics are covered throughout the
article: (1) what the standard of valuation is; (2) how this standard is ap-
plied to property taken or damaged in condemnation; (3) permissible evi-
dence of value in a typical condemnation proceeding; and (4) who has the
burden of proof.
13. Albert W. Stone, Montana Water Rights - A New Opportunity, 34 Mont. L. Rev. 57 (1973).
14. Mont. Const. art. IX, § 3.
15. John F. Sullivan, Student Author, The Montana law of Valuation in Eminent Domain, 34 Mont.
L. Rev. 90 (1973).
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Montana's Constitution provides: "Private property shall not be taken
or damaged for public use without just compensation having first been
made to . .. the owner."' 6 Just compensation is an equitable standard, mea-
sured by the traditional flexible principles of equity, and no one formula of
measurement applies universally to all cases. This article highlights three
standards by which just compensation could be measured: (1) value of the
property to the taker; (2) value of the property to the owner; and (3) market
value. In Montana, market value is the usual standard for measuring just
compensation. For the most part, Montana's law of valuation in eminent
domain is the same as that of most other jurisdictions.
Justice Court Reform in Montana17-Lon T. Holden
This article examines deficiencies existing in Montana's justice court
system in light of Article VII, § 5 of the Montana Constitution, which reaf-
firms the constitutional status of justice courts.' 8 According to the author,
the passage of Montana's new Constitution and its ultimate validation by
the Montana Supreme Court make change in Montana's justice court sys-
tem inevitable.
Under Montana's new Constitution, the Legislature is mandated to es-
tablish qualifications for the office of justice of the peace.' 9 This article
sets forth several suggested qualifications for the Legislature to consider,
including: (1) a requirement that justices of the peace be U.S. Citizens; (2) a
requirement that justices of the peace be residents in the county where elec-
tion is sought; (3) a minimum age requirement; and (4) a requirement that
justices of the peace be attorneys.
This article also addresses several criticisms leveled at the Montana
justice court system, such as the lack of adequate quarters in which justices
can handle their caseloads, inadequate compensation for justices, and the
lack of a supervising authority. The article concludes with the author urg-
ing the Legislature to reform Montana's justice court system.
16. Mont. Const. art. ll, § 14.
17. Lon T. Holden, Student Author, Justice Court Reform in Montana, 34 Mont. L. Review 122
(1973).
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The Passing of Sovereign Immunity in Montana: The King is Dead!20 -
Barry L. Hjort
The 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention adopted Article II, § 18,
which waives the State's sovereign immunity without limitations.21 Previ-
ously, Montana's Constitution neither authorized nor prohibited sovereign
immunity. For almost 50 years the Montana Supreme Court and Legisla-
ture roughly defined the bounds of sovereign immunity. Disrupting these
precedents, the 1972 Constitution waived the State's immunity from any
suit for injury to person or property. The complete abolition of sovereign
immunity, however, is too simplistic and an illogical alternative to unlim-
ited sovereign immunity.
In the realm of tort liability, government entities are not identical to
private entities because some government undertakings, such as law en-
forcement and fire fighting, are inherently dangerous. In the State's pursuit
to govern, it sometimes inflicts unavoidable damage on private parties. Ar-
ticle II, § 18 places a duty on all government entities to safeguard against
liability by obtaining insurance and acting with extreme caution where lia-
bility might arise. However, there remains an uncomfortable uncertainty of
increased litigation against the State. The Legislature should remedy this
predicament by amending § 18 to allow reasonable limitations to the abso-
lute bar of sovereign immunity. An amendment would allow the govern-
ment to employ sovereign immunity in limited, specified areas to prevent
the disruption of state operations.
A Constitutional Remedy for Injured Employees22-Gerald B. Murphy
The 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention included § 16 in the
State Constitution's Declaration of Rights. 23 Section 16 provides for the
equal and speedy administration of justice, except for injured employees
whose immediate employer provides workmen's compensation coverage.
In effect, § 16 still allows an employee of an independent contractor to
bring a third-party liability suit against the general employer. Prior to the
adoption of § 16, judicial interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation
Act barred a third-party employee from bringing a claim against a general
contractor if that employee's immediate employer participated in the Work-
men's Compensation program.
20. Barry L. Hjort, The Passing of Sovereign Immunity in Montana: The King is Dead!, 34 Mont.
L. Rev. 283 (1973).
21. Mont. Const. art. II, § 18.
22. Gerald B. Murphy, Student Author, A Constitutional Remedy for Injured Employees, 35 Mont.
L. Rev. 119 (1974).
23. Mont. Const. art. I, § 16.
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In 1965, the Legislature amended Montana's Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act to preclude explicitly general employers from liability. In re-
sponse, many advocated the adoption of article H, § 16. The 1972 Conven-
tion's Bill of Rights Committee agreed that the status of workmen's com-
pensation law violated the spirit of a speedy remedy. However, the
adoption of § 16 reversed judicial and legislative interpretations of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. Although the State should grant all injured
persons a full and speedy remedy, the change in workmen's compensation
law exposed general employers to liability that they had previously avoided.
The Legal Status of the Montana University System under the New
Montana Constitution24-Hugh V. Schaefer
The adoption of Article X, § 9 by the 1972 Montana Constitutional
Convention significantly changed the structure of the higher educational
system. 25 Previously, Article XI, § 11 provided only for the supervision of
the university and state educational institutions by a single Board of Educa-
tion.26 Article X, § 9 created two separate Boards of Education, one for
higher education and one for elementary and secondary education. The del-
egates to the Convention sought to release the Board from excessive legisla-
tive control by allowing the Board to define its own powers and duties.
Consequently, the Board of Regents for Montana's university system has
become its own constitutional department, far out-reaching the powers of
the prior Board of Education, whose powers relied solely on legislative
mandate.
The Board has full power to manage and control higher education, and
the possibility of limiting the scope of the Board's autonomy seems remote.
Because judicial precedent has long upheld the Legislature's intent to vest
the Board with substantial autonomy,27 the Board is not subject to legisla-
tion prior to the adoption of Article X, § 9 concerning its duties and powers.
The 1972 Constitutional Convention established a quasi-independent de-
partment and subjected the Board of Regents only to indirect legislative and
executive control of audits, apportionment, and appointments.
24. Hugh V. Schaefer, The Legal Status of the Montana University System under the New Montana
Constitution, 35 Mont. L. Rev. 189 (1974).
25. Mont. Const. art. X, § 9.
26. Mont. Const. art. XI, § 11 (1889).
27. State ex rel. Veeder v. St. Bd. of Educ., 33 P.2d 516 (1934).
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The Role of the Montana Supreme Court in Constitutional Revision2 8
Ellis Waldron
Article II, § 2 of the Montana Constitution grants the citizenry the
right to alter the Constitution.2 9 However, this clear grant of power may be
symbolic rather than determinative given the activist role the Court has
played in the history of constitutional revision. Early on, the Court as-
sumed authority over the amending process. The Court first involved itself
when it nullified three of the five amendments proposed at the beginning of
Montana's statehood. Similarly, the Court was markedly involved during
the adoption of Montana's 1972 Constitution.
Although Article XIX, § 8 of the 1889 Constitution provided basic
guidance for the revision process, there was much room for the Court's
interpretation.30 The 1971 Legislature invited the Court to make initial
judgments concerning the process, including the election and power of dele-
gates, and expenditures for voter education. However, the Court's deci-
sions did not rest on any provision of Article XIX and were often contrary
to constitutional interpretation in other states. Although it may be difficult
for the Court to make such decisions in the heat of political debate, the
justices are obligated to base their decisions on sound constitutional prem-
ises when delving into the center of constitutional revision.
Eminent Domain: Exploitation of Montana's Natural Resources31-
James M. Kaze
This article traces the history of eminent domain in Montana with spe-
cial emphasis on the use of condemnation in exploiting natural resources.
Specifically, the article discusses the differences between treating natural
resources under a public benefit theory and under a public use theory. The
1889 Constitutional Convention discussed eminent domain due largely in
part to concerns about adequacy of water for irrigation. Focusing on water
use, the framers declared it a public use subject to the condemnation power.
Legislative and judicial misapplication of this sentiment led Montana to
embrace a system where any proposed taking of private property without
the owner's consent could be upheld in court upon a showing that the con-
demned property would benefit the public in some way. By defining public
28. Ellis Waldron, The Role of the Montana Supreme Court in Constitutional Revision, 35 Mont. L.
Rev. 227 (1974).
29. Mont. Const. art. II, § 2.
30. Mont. Const. art. XIX, § 8 (1888).
31. James M. Kaze, Student Author, Eminent Domain: Exploitation of Montana's Natural
Resources, 35 Mont. L. Rev. 279 (1974).
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use as equivalent to public benefit, the courts eliminated the constitutional
limitations on eminent domain.
The 1972 Constitution led Montana toward a public use theory by
granting the public ownership of the State's water and directing the Legisla-
ture to provide for the administration and control of water rights.32 Finding
it unlikely that Montana will abandon the public benefit doctrine, the author
urges the Legislature to plainly define the limits of the power of eminent
domain. He asserts that state administration of the condemnation power
allows the public to decide the preferred public uses of valuable natural
resources and prevents eminent domain from being exercised to exploit re-
sources solely for profit.
Equality for Men and Women, Three Approaches: Frontiero, The Equal
Rights Amendment, and the Montana Equal Dignities
Provision33-Joan Uda
This article advocates for judicial activism in interpreting the equal
dignities provision in the 1972 Constitution34 as an expansive guarantee of
gender equality. Progress made toward the equality of women on the na-
tional level should not be a substitute for under-enforcing Montana's equal
dignities provision. Although sex as a classification became quasi-suspect
under Frontiero v. Richardson,35 the Supreme Court was not willing to ap-
ply strict scrutiny. In addition, Montana should not rely on the proposed
federal Equal Rights Amendment because it addresses only state action.
Documents from Montana's Constitutional Convention illustrate the
intent of the framers to eliminate discrimination based on sex without wait-
ing for a federal Equal Rights Amendment, which would not explicitly pro-
vide as much protection as Montana's equal dignities provision. That pro-
vision is directed not only at state action but also private actions not reached
by the Fourteenth Amendment. The article discusses which private actions
the framers intended to cover under the equal dignities provision and what
they meant by "civil or political right." This would, at minimum, include
any rights protected by the federal Constitution and acts of Congress. Mon-
tana need not wait either for the Supreme Court to acknowledge sex as a
suspect classification or for the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment
when the State's guarantee is more broad and superior in scope.
32. Mont. Const. art. IX, § 3.
33. Joan Uda, Student Author, Equality for Men and Women, Three Approaches: Frontiero, The
Equal Rights Amendment, and the Montana Equal Dignities Provision, 35 Mont. L. Rev. 325 (1974).
34. Mont. Const. art. II, § 4.
35. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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Recent Developments in Montana Land Use Law 36-James H. Goetz
This article discusses developments in land use law, focusing on at-
tempts to counter the effects of population expansion, urban sprawl, and
recreational development. The article touches briefly on many aspects of
land use law. The 1972 Montana Constitution is discussed in the context of
zoning and the Natural Areas Act.
Prior to the 1972 Montana Constitution, counties could exercise only
the powers expressly granted to them by the State. The local government
section of the 1972 Montana Constitution37 expanded and liberalized the
powers of city, town, and county governments. The Constitutional Conven-
tion's intent was to expand the powers of local governments by granting
counties general legislative and ministerial powers, including powers rele-
vant to zoning.
The article also discusses problems that arise under the Natural Areas
Act. Although school trust lands are eligible for natural area designation,
strict guidelines are placed on the disposition of these lands. The Montana
Constitution states "The public school fund shall forever remain inviolate,
guarantee by the state against loss or diversion." 38 According to the opin-
ion of the Attorney General, designating school trust lands as natural areas
without monetary compensation violates the Enabling Act and the Montana
Constitution. The author, however, argues that the precedent relied on by
the Attorney General is distinct from the situation in Montana. Further-
more, for the Natural Areas Act to be effective, designation of trust lands
without monetary compensation is necessary.
Recent Developments in Montana Natural Resources Law3 9-
Stephen D. Roberts & Albert W. Stone
Article IX of the Montana Constitution" imposes on the Legislature a
duty to enforce the goals enumerated therein. These goals fall within four
sections: protecting and improving the environment, reclaiming mining
lands, recording and administering water rights, and preserving and enhanc-
ing cultural resources. This article surveys major pieces of environmental
and natural resource legislation passed in Montana since 1972.
The article mostly summarizes the developments, but at times dis-
cusses problems with the new legislation. For instance, the Hard Rock Rec-
36. James H. Goetz, Recent Developments in Montana Land Use Law, 38 Mont. L. Rev. 97 (1977).
37. Mont. Const. art. XI.
38. Id. at art. X, § 3.
39. Stephen D. Roberts, Student Author, & Albert W. Stone, Recent Developments in Montana
Natural Resources Law, 38 Mont. L. Rev. 169 (1977).
40. Mont. Const. art. IX.
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lamation Act and the Open Cut Mining Act were both designed to ensure
proper reclamation though a system of permitting, bonding, and regulatory
review. Both Acts sought to benefit the "small miner" by excusing lands
with small mining operations from the process. However, the Constitution
requires that "all lands disturbed by the taking of natural resources shall be
reclaimed."4 1 While the Legislature responded thoughtfully and compre-
hensively to Article IX, more work needs to be done to make natural re-
source laws more effective.
The Montana Constitution: Taking New Rights Seriously-
General Introduction42
This general introduction discusses the trend in state constitutional re-
vision to add new fundamental rights. It raises the question of whether or
not state appellate courts will give new guarantees the appropriate treatment
that their constitutional status implies. The introduction suggests that state
courts so often defer to the federal judiciary to develop fundamental rights
that they neglect their own constitutional provisions. Courts are obligated
to assign constitutional guarantees sufficient weight to resist policy argu-
ments. In order to "take rights seriously" the courts must consider the
weight and scope of new constitutional guarantees.
The Montana Constitution: Taking New Rights Seriously-Environmental
Rights4 3-Daniel Kemmis
This article examines several issues likely to be litigated over the envi-
ronmental provisions in the Montana Constitution, including standing,
whether the provisions are self-executing, and the standard to be applied
under the provisions. The article addresses these issues by examining Mon-
tana Wilderness Assn. v. Board of Health & Environmental Sciences (Bea-
ver Creek 1),4 a withdrawn opinion that still exists in the form of a dissent.
The Montana Constitution does not explicitly grant environmental
standing to all citizens, but the redefinition of "injury" may provide redress.
The Constitution recognizes "the right to a clean and healthful environ-
ment." 4 5 Infringement of that right may be a legal injury, which any citizen
could assert. Although questions arise as to whether Article XI is self-exe-
41. Id. at art. IX, § 2(1).
42. The Montana Constitution: Taking New Rights Seriously - General Introduction, 39 Mont. L.
Rev. 221 (1978).
43. Daniel Kemmis, The Montana Constitution: Taking New Rights Seriously-Environmental
Rights, 39 Mont. L. Rev. 224 (1978).
44. Mont. Wilderness Assn. v. Bd. of Health & Env. Sci., 559 P.2d 1157 (Mont. 1976).
45. Mont. Const. art. IX, § 1(3).
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cuting due to the addition of the legislative duty, the "clean and healthful"
language provides a basis for judicial review. The language operates as a
limitation upon governmental activity and places no affirmative duty on the
Legislature. These characteristics support the conclusion that the provision
is self-executing.
It is important that the Montana Supreme Court responds to the consti-
tutional status of new environmental rights by giving them the weight ap-
propriate for a "fundamental" right. The Court should look to Beaver Creek
I for guidance in interpreting issues of standing, standards of review, and
self-execution.
The Montana Constitution: Taking New Rights Seriously-Equal
Rights 46-Jeanne Koester
This comment discusses the standard of review that courts should ap-
ply in sex discrimination cases under the Montana Constitution's equal
rights provision.47 The author criticizes the Montana Supreme Court's
1976 decision to employ rational basis review in State v. Craig,4 8 arguing
that minimal scrutiny fails to take the prohibition against sex discrimination
seriously.
The author urges the Court to adopt a standard of review recom-
mended by the Yale Law Review for cases under the proposed Equal Rights
Amendment. Under the so-called equal protection standard, the prohibition
against discrimination is absolute, with just two exceptions: the equal rights
provision would not override other constitutional rights, and dissimilar
treatment would be allowed if based on physical characteristics unique to
one sex.
The Montana Constitution: Taking New Rights Seriously-Rights in
Collision: The Individual Right of Privacy and the Public
Right to Know49-David Gorman
This comment explores the potential conflict between the public's
right to know and an individual's right to privacy under the Montana Con-
stitution. The Constitutional Convention placed a high value on the right to
privacy, providing in the text of the Constitution, that the right to privacy
46. Jeanne M. Koester, Student Author, The Montana Constitution: Taking New Rights Seriously-
Equal Rights, 39 Mont. L. Rev. 238 (1978).
47. Mont. Const. art. 1I, § 4.
48. State v. Craig, 545 P.2d 649 (1976).
49. David Gorman, Student Author, The Montana Constitution: Taking New Rights Seriously-
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"shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state inter-
est."50 The Convention also valued the public's right to know, allowing an
exception only "where the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the
merits of public disclosure."5 '
By 1978, Montana courts had not yet considered the scope of these
rights or the proper inquiry should the rights conflict. The author proposes
that the Montana Supreme Court undertake a three-part inquiry to weigh
these rights when they conflict. First, he argues the Court should adopt the
test from Katz v. U.S.52 that states a privacy right exists when there is a
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as objectively rea-
sonable. Second, the Court should determine whether the public's right to
know in the case at hand constitutes a compelling state interest. Finally, the
Court should determine whether the compelling interest is clearly exceeded
by the privacy interests at stake.
Adjudication of Indian Water Rights: Implementation of the 1979
Amendments to the Montana Water Use Act5 3 -
Michael F. Lamb
This comment discusses the need to quantify Indian reserved water
rights in Montana so that other water rights may be adjudicated in accor-
dance with the 1979 amendments to Montana's Water Use Act.5 4 The au-
thor predicts that the Montana Constitution will not prevent the State from
adjudicating Indian water rights. Article I disclaims state jurisdiction over
Indian lands except as otherwise provided by the "consent of the United
States and the people of Montana."5 5 The author argues that the United
States consented to state adjudication of Indian reserved water rights in the
McCarran Amendment and the people of Montana consented by passing the
1979 amendments to the Water Use Act.
50. Mont. Const. art. II, § 10.
51. Id. at art. H, § 9.
52. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
53. Micheal F. Lamb, Student Author, Adjudication of Indian Water Rights: Implementation of the
1979 Amendments to the Montana Water Use, 41 Mont. L. Rev. 73 (1980).
54. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 3-7-101 to 3-7-502, 85-2-211 to 85-2-243, 85-2-701 to 85-2-704,
2-15-212 (1979).
55. Mont. Const. art. I.
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Of Crabbed Interpretations and Frustrated Mandates: The Effect of
Environmental Policy Acts on Pre-existing Agency
Authority56-Carl W. Tobias & Daniel N. McLean
This article critically analyzes the decisions of the Montana Supreme
Court and state agencies to interpret the National Environmental Policy
Act57 (NEPA) and Montana Environmental Policy Act58 (MEPA) narrowly.
Unlike other jurisdictions in 1980, Montana took the position that agencies
are not permitted to consider in their decision-making any environmental
factors not expressly provided for in the legislation. The authors argue this
interpretation is incorrect; the legislation encompassed a broader policy.
Furthermore, they argue two provisions of the Montana Constitution 5 9 but-
tress the general mandate of NEPA and MEPA that agencies should con-
sider the ecological impacts of their decisions.
The authors conclude that both the Constitution's environmental provi-
sions should be considered self-executing and, even separate from MEPA,
impose an obligation on government officials to consider the environmental
impacts of their decisions. The authors urge the Montana Supreme Court to
reconsider its narrow interpretation of MEPA in light of legislative intent,
the jurisprudence of other jurisdictions, and the environmental obligations
laid out in the Montana Constitution.
Intrusion, Exclusion, and Confusion: State v. Helfrich: The Exclusionary
Rule and Acts of Private Persons60-Richard A. Reep
This note discusses the decision of the Montana Supreme Court in
State v. Helfrich61 to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained from
an illegal search and seizure by a private person. The author argues that the
Montana Supreme Court should only apply the exclusionary rule to cases
involving invasions of privacy by state actors. He argues that the history of
the exclusionary rule, modern jurisprudence on the right to privacy, and the
limited deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on private persons do not
support Montana's unique application of the rule to illegal searches by pri-
vate persons.
56. Carl W. Tobias & Daniel N. McLean, Of Crabbed Interpretations and Frustrated Mandates:
The Effect of Environmental Policy Acts on Pre-existing Agency Authority, 41 Mont. L. Rev. 177 (1980).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1977).
58. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 75-1-101 to 75-1-324 (1979).
59. Mont. Const. art. I, § 3, art. IX, § 1(1).
60. Richard A. Reep, Intrusion, Exclusion, and Confusion: State v. Helfrich: The Exclusionary
Rule and Acts of Private Persons, 41 Mont. L. Rev. 281 (1980).
61. State v. Helfrich, 600 P.2d 816 (1979).
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Montana Green River Ordinance62-Dennis Paxinos
This article analyzes Tipco Corp., Inc. v. City of Billings,63 which
holds that Montana communities may not exempt local business from
prohibitions on door-to-door sales.
Green River ordinances prohibit door-to-door peddling by merchants
who have not received permission to enter from the property owners or
occupants. Billings' Green River ordinance was typical in most respects,
but contained a noteworthy exception: merchants located within a 150 mile
radius of Billings were not subject to its provisions.
Tipco, which was located outside the radius, challenged the Billings
ordinance on the ground that it violated equal protection. The Montana
Supreme Court agreed, determining that the law was unconstitutional under
both the Montana and U.S. Constitutions. Under Tipco, Montana Green
River ordinances cannot contain exceptions for locally-situated businesses;
all door-to-door sales must be banned in order for the ordinance to survive
an equal protection challenge.
The author criticizes the decision, pointing out that the Montana Su-
preme Court declared it was applying only rational basis review; however,
the Court looked only to Billings' stated reasons for its ordinance. Under
rational basis review, courts speculate on plausible reasons for a law. An
ordinance similar to the one at issue in Tipco was upheld against an equal
protection challenge by the New York Court of Appeals.64
Federalism and State Constitutions: The New Doctrine of Independent
and Adequate State Grounds65-Larry M. Elison &
Dennis NettikSimmons
This article traces the evolution of the doctrine of independent and
adequate state grounds. A state court must fulfill two requirements in order
for the doctrine to apply. First, the court must clearly indicate that it is
relying on independent state grounds for its opinion. Second, those grounds
must be sufficient to control the issues at bar.
The authors analyze two Montana cases that show the doctrine's appli-
cation. In State v. Jackson,66 the Montana Supreme Court relied on a mixed
62. Denis Paxinos, Student Author, Montana Green River Ordinances, 44 Mont. L. Rev. 297
(1983).
63. Tipco Corp., Inc. v. City of Billings, 642 P.2d 1074 (Mont. 1982).
64. People v. Bohnke, 38 N.E.2d 478, 479 (N.Y. 1951).
65. Larry M. Elison & Dennis NettikSimmons, Student Author, Federalism and State
Constitutions: The New Doctrine of Independent and Adequate State Grounds, 45 Mont. L. Rev. 177
(1984).
66. State v. Jackson, 637 P.2d I (Mont. 1981).
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analysis of federal and state constitutional law in determining that a Mon-
tana statute allowing a defendant's refusal to take a breathalyzer test into
evidence violated both the Montana and U.S. Constitutions. The Montana
Court's interpretation of the State's Constitution was not clearly indepen-
dent of its federal constitutional interpretation. Since the Montana Court's
decision had ambiguously relied on independent and adequate state
grounds, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the deci-
sion after it decided in another case that a defendant's refusal to take a
breathalyzer test was admissible into evidence and did not violate the fed-
eral Constitution.
In Jackson II, the Montana Supreme Court determined that it had
based its interpretation of the Montana Constitution on its interpretation of
the U.S. Constitution, overruled its previous holding, and allowed the de-
fendant's refusal to take a breathalyzer test into evidence.
Fair Trial and Free Press: The Courtroom Door Swings Open67
Steve Carey
This article analyzes the procedure that Montana federal and state
courts must undertake before closing criminal trial proceedings to the pub-
lic.
The Montana Supreme Court has relied on the Montana Constitution's
right to know provision68 to protect public access to state-level judicial pro-
ceedings. The Montana Supreme Court has held that the right to know
provision imposes "a stricter standard [than its federal counterpart] in order
to authorize closure."69
Closure of proceedings in Montana is controlled by State ex. rel. Smith
v. District Court of Eight Judicial District, Cascade County, which adopted
Standard 8-3.2 of the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal
Justice. This standard dictates that Montana courts must first consider
workable alternatives to closure, such as agreements with the media not to
publicize excessively prejudicial information. 70 Montana courts may order
closure only when leaving proceedings open "would create a clear and pre-
sent danger to the fairness of defendant's trial." 7' Meeting this threshold
presents attorneys with a high burden.
67. Steve Carey, Student Author, Fair Trial and Free Press: The Courtroom Door Swings Open,
45 Mont. L. Rev. 323 (1984).
68. Mont. Const. art. II, § 9.
69. Great Falls Tribune v. Dist. Ct., 608 P.2d 116, 120 (Mont. 1980), overruled, St. ex rel Smith v.
Dist. Ct. of 8th Jud. Dist. Cascade Co., 654 P.2d 982, 987 (Mont. 1982).
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Towards a Theory of State Constitutional Jurisprudence7 2
Dennis NettikSimmons
This article discusses the relationship between state versus federal con-
stitutional interpretation.
Rules of Construction from the federal context are useful in interpret-
ing state constitutions, but there are key differences between state constitu-
tions and their federal counterpart. For example, in states which elect
judges, state courts may be more sensitive to the democratic process. Addi-
tionally, many justiciability concerns that federal courts invoke when refus-
ing to hear cases are not present at the state level; some states even allow
their supreme courts to issue advisory opinions. Finally, attorneys should
be aware that many states have extensively amended their constitutions
within the past decade. Unlike the various state constitutions, the U.S. Con-
stitution has proven exceedingly difficult to amend.
The article contains extensive philosophical analysis on the role of ju-
dicial review and its impact on state constitutional jurisprudence.
Right of Privacy73-Larry M. Elison & Dennis NettikSimmons
This article explores the development of the right of privacy in both
the federal and Montana systems. The right is rooted in the common law's
reverence for individual property rights. The authors devote much of the
article to tracing the privacy right's evolution in the federal court system.
The 1972 Montana Constitution is one of only a few state constitutions
that contain an express right of privacy. 7 4 In State v. Long, the Montana
Supreme Court held that this guarantee does not protect individuals from
the acts of other private persons; rather, it only provides protection from
state actors.75 The authors marshal impressive evidence in support of their
argument that Long was wrongly decided. For example, transcripts of the
1972 Montana Constitutional Convention indicate that the delegates were
greatly concerned about invasions of individual privacy by private third
parties unaffiliated with the State.
Montana's Constitution also contains a "right to know" provision.76
The authors believe that the right to know provision buttresses the right to
72. Dennis NettikSimmons, Student Author, Towards a Theory of State Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 46 Mont. L. Rev. 261 (1985).
73. Larry M. Elison & Dennis NettikSimmons, Student Author, Right of Privacy, 48 Mont. L. Rev.
1 (1985).
74. Mont. Const. art. I, § 9.
75. State v. Long, 700 P.2d 153, 156 (Mont. 1985).
76. Mont. Const. art. II, § 9.
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privacy by allowing individuals some degree of control over the use and
distribution of their personal information that is held by the State.
Constitutional Initiative 30: What Constitutional Rights did Montanans
Surrender in Hopes of Securing Liability Insurance ?77-
Bari R. Burke
A byproduct of the insurance industry's push for tort reform, Constitu-
tional Initiative 30 allows the Legislature to limit or abolish common-law
remedies. The author contends that the debate over Initiative 30 lacked
depth, and failed to inform the public of the significant ramifications of its
passage. In their haste for tort reform, Montanans abrogated their previ-
ously certain right to legal redress for compensable personal injuries.
Early jurisprudence on Article II, § 16 of the Montana Constitution
held that the Legislature was free to abolish common law causes of action.78
Later on (before the development of Initiative 30) the Montana Supreme
Court held that Article II, § 16 of the Montana Constitution mandated that
the Legislature provide substitute remedies when modifying the common
law.7 9 Initiative 30 essentially restores the former interpretation.
Much of the article is devoted to an in-depth historical analysis of the
various cases arising under Article II, § 16 of the current Montana Constitu-
tion and its predecessor, Article IHl, § 6 of the 1889 Montana Constitution.
Butte Community Union v. Lewis: A New Constitutional Standard for
Evaluating General Assistance Legislation8 0-Scott C. Wurster
This article discusses the Montana Supreme Court's constitutional
analysis of general assistance requirements enacted by the Legislature in
1985. When age restrictions were placed on eligibility for welfare, a group
of recipients filed suit alleging violations of equal protection8 ' and of the
Montana Constitution's guarantee of "economic assistance" for the aged,
infirm, or misfortunate. 82 While the Court discerned no fundamental right
to welfare, it did find that the legislation violated equal protection and was
thus unconstitutional.83 In this decision, the Court applied a middle-tier
77. Bari R. Burke, Constitutional Initiative 30: What Constitutional Rights did Montanans
Surrender in Hopes of Securing Liability Insurance?, 48 Mont. L. Rev 53 (1987).
78. Reeves v. Ille Electric Co., 551 P.2d 647, 651 (Mont. 1976).
79. Corrigan v. Janney, 626 P.2d 838, 840 (Mont. 1981), overruled, Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc.,
776 P.2d 488, 491 (Mont. 1989).
80. Scott C. Wurster, Butte Community Union v. Lewis: A New Constitutional Standard for
Evaluating General Assistance, 48 Mont. L. Rev. 163 (1987).
81. Mont. Const. art. I1, § 4.
82. Id. at art. XII, § 3(3).
83. Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309 (Mont. 1986).
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standard of review for the first time. The Court reasoned that because eco-
nomic assistance was specifically mentioned in the Montana Constitution,
any restrictions on welfare warranted a heightened standard of analysis.
The Montana Legislature then amended the general assistance bill by
deleting any reference to age and, instead, implemented restrictions based
on income. The Court upheld this legislation, finding the classification rea-
sonable and that the State's interest in saving money outweighed the inter-
est in obtaining benefits for those with a greater income.84
This article concludes by reconciling these two decisions and attempt-
ing to refine how the Court will, and should, apply this middle-tier standard
in the future.
The Montana Supreme Court in Politics85-James J. Lopach
This article discusses the Montana Supreme Court's interpretation of
the Montana Constitution regarding tort reform in 1983 and welfare reform
in 1986. In addressing tort reform, the Court focused on the constitutional
guarantee of a "remedy afforded for every injury of person, property, or
character." 86 In doing so, the Court found that exceptions to state and local
tort immunity created by the Legislature were unconstitutional.87
The Expectancy of Parole in Montana: A Right Entitled to Some Due
Process88-Linda M. Trueb
This article discusses the due process protections afforded to inmates
after the United States Supreme Court held there is a right to expect parole
if statutory language creates a presumption of release.8 9 Some due process
attaches to this right in Montana because state law mandates parole after a
prisoner has satisfied certain eligibility requirements.90 Montana has met
the minimum standard for parole rights as set forth by the Supreme Court
because it provides inmates with prior notice, a hearing, and notification of
the Parole Board's decision. Affording Montana prisoners greater procedu-
ral protections, however, would increase confidence and fairness in the ju-
dicial system. Because parole has previously been denied based on errors
in a prisoner's file, inmates should additionally receive a summary of the
84. Deaconess Med. Ctr. v. Dept. of Soc. & Rehabilitation Servs., 220 Mont 127, 132 (1986).
85. James J. Lopach, The Montana Supreme Court in Politics, 48 Mont. L. Rev. 267 (1987).
86. Mont. Const. art. II, § 16.
87. White v. State, 203 Mont. 363, 367-370 (1983).
88. Linda M. Trueb, The Expectancy of Parole in Montana: A Right Entitled to Some Due Process,
48 Mont. L. Rev. 379 (1987).
89. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979).
90. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-201.
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evidence against them prior to their hearing so that they may rebut such
evidence.
Concerning welfare reform, the Court relied on the constitutional pro-
vision stating the "legislature shall provide" economic assistance for those
in need.91 There, the Court found the Legislature's newly-imposed age re-
strictions for welfare eligibility violated equal protection. 92
This article argues that both decisions were reached erroneously as a
result of the Court's failure to: (1) review the unambiguous intentions of the
delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention; (2) adhere to
prior case law; (3) respect the Legislature as the lawmaking body; and (4)
honor Montana's value of popular governance.
Toward Dignity in the Workplace: Miller-Wohl and Beyond93-
Wendy A. Fitzgerald
This article discusses sex disdrimination regarding a woman's leave
from employment in the federal system as opposed to that articulated in the
Montana Constitution. Although federal courts employ an equal treatment
analysis under Title VII, such an approach is flawed because it fails to ac-
count for all forms of discrimination a woman faces in the workplace.
Moreover, the federal analysis affords women protection from discrimina-
tion, but only insofar as they are willing and capable of performing in the
workplace to the extent men always have. Conversely, the Montana Consti-
tution states that "dignity of the human being is inviolable." 9 4 This lan-
guage necessitates a more searching inquiry because, in the case of an em-
ployee who is a mother, courts scrutinize her collective experience in the
community above her experience in the workplace.
Although the language of the Montana Constitution offers a greater
opportunity to combat sex discrimination as a whole, the Montana Supreme
Court has largely elected to follow the federal model prohibiting discrimi-
nation in employment. The onus is, thus, upon Montana attorneys to de-
velop a new analysis reflecting equality and dignity in sex discrimination
cases. The Montana Legislature should also continue to develop programs
targeting discrimination and recognizing the inherent worth of every indi-
vidual.
91. Mont. Const. art. XII, § 3(3).
92. Butte Community Union, 712 P.2d 1309 (Mont. 1986).
93. Wendy A. Fitzerald, Toward Dignity in the Workplace: Miller-Wohl and Beyond, 49 Mont. L.
Rev. 147 (1988).
94. Mont. Const. art. II, § 4.
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Keynote Speech to the Law School Symposium on the 1972
Constitution95-Stan Stephens
In this article, former Governor Stan Stephens expressed his views on
Montana's 1972 Constitution 18 years after its ratification. He first notes
the peculiarity in which the new Constitution was adopted: 44 of Montana's
56 counties rejected the document, yet it was approved by a margin of
2,532 votes. Stephens briefly discussed some problems with the 1972 Con-
stitution in the form of broadened judicial powers and ambiguous legisla-
tive duties. He then explained its favorable attributes including the line-
item and amendatory veto power which give the legislative and executive
powers more flexibility. Stephens concluded by stating that although the
new Constitution specifically contemplates additional conventions in the fu-
ture,96 such a measure was not warranted as the present document serves
the people well.
The 1972 Montana Constitution in Historical Context 97-Richard Roeder
This article provides a brief history of the Montana Constitution from
the 1889 Convention to the events triggering the 1972 Convention. The
drafters of the original Constitution, fearing corruption from politicians,
wrote a lengthy document full of details designed to protect the new State.
In addition, the 1889 drafters mandated the Legislature meet only for short
biennial terms in which the members were confined by detailed restrictions
on taxation. Similarly, the executive branch was to be divided among seven
major elective officers who would presumably check and balance each
other.
Problems with the 1889 Constitution arose quickly and persisted until
1972. As time passed and technology grew, demands on the Legislature
increased. Favorable legislation was often passed, but the result was an
expanding bureaucracy; by 1920, there were over one hundred executive
branch officers, commissions, and boards.
Although the Legislature attempted to remedy these problems, the
specificity of the original draft prompted response to details rather than de-
sign. In 1965, the bills for amendments to the Constitution rose to as high
as 32, yet the limit of three amendments on the general election ballot sti-
fled any meaningful progress. Shortcomings in the court system also pro-
duced a strain on the judicial branch; only two court amendments were
95. Stan Stephens, Keynote Speech to the Law School Symposium on the 1972 Constitution, 51
Mont. L. Rev. 237 (1990).
96. Mont. Const. art. XIV, § 3.
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approved before the 1972 Constitution. Consequently, many problems
lingered concerning elections, the inferior court system, and judicial re-
sources.
By the late 1960s these insurmountable obstacles combined with de-
manding economic conditions to form a catalyst for wholesale constitu-
tional reform.
The 1972 Montana Constitution in a Contemporary Context98-
Harry W. Fritz
This article offers a brief description of the events from the 1960s to
the ratification of the 1972 Montana Constitution. A major force in the
transition was a federal mandate from the U.S. Supreme Court for legisla-
tive reapportionment. The 1889 constitutional system was designed for a
rural polity and thus allowed one representative from each of the 56 coun-
ties. When urban senators and representatives were added based on data
from the 1960 census, constitutional reform was imminent. Once the Legis-
lature put a proposition for a Constitutional Convention to the voters in
1970, it passed with a sixty-five percent majority.
The selection of 100 convention delegates in 1971 was also notable. A
simultaneous vote on a sales tax was rejected by a seventy percent margin.
The tax effort backfired on the republicans who sponsored the bill when 58
democrats and six independents were elected for the Constitutional Conven-
tion.
A prospering economy also influenced the constitutional reform. The
late 1960s and early 1970s marked high returns in logging, mining, and
farming, all of which encouraged change to perpetuate the lucrative busi-
nesses.
An environmental movement was also triggered when a North Central
Power study of 1971 predicted coal-fired electrical generating plants and
the possible diversion of half of the Yellowstone River. This finding, cou-
pled with voter response, led the Convention to adopt a provision ensuring
"a clean and healthful environment." 9 9
98. Harry W. Fritz, The 1972 Montana Constitution in a Contemporary Context, 51 Mont. L. Rev.
270 (1990).
99. Mont. Const. art. II, § 3.
530 Vol. 71
28
Montana Law Review, Vol. 71 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol71/iss2/10
ARTICLES ON THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION
Implementation and Amendment of the 1972 Constitution 10
Diana S. Dowling
This article discusses the ongoing process of implementing the 1972
Montana Constitution. The 1973 Legislature passed the most significant
legislation involving the new Constitution, including some 60 bills. The
task of writing and enacting the legislation necessary to complete the Con-
stitution fell to legislative staff members, who studied areas in which the
new Constitution conflicted with old statutory law.
While implementing the 1972 Constitution, both the convention dele-
gates and the legislators who passed amendments to the Constitution tapped
into their own beliefs and values, what the author calls "programming."
Programming changes from generation to generation; thus, the Montana
Constitution will change over time as the beliefs of society change.
Programming occurred in relevant constitutional areas such as individ-
ual liberties, revenue and finance, the environment, and the judiciary. For
example, the 1974 Montana Commission on Human Rights was developed
by an act preventing discrimination in employment, public accommoda-
tions, education, and real property transactions. Additionally, many envi-
ronmental acts were passed after the 1972 Constitution, including the Com-
prehensive Environmental Cleanup and Responsibility Act.
As the values and beliefs of Montanans continue to change over time,
so will legislation implementing the 1972 Montana Constitution. While
there is no guarantee that the will of the majority will be well reasoned
when applied to Montana law, legislators' differences in opinion will bal-
ance one another to aid a common good.
Interpretations of the Montana Constitution: Sometimes Socratic,
Sometimes Erratic10 -James H. Goetz
This article explores the unique characteristics of the 1972 Montana
Constitution. First, the article discusses the proper role of state constitu-
tions in the federal system. Next, the article approaches the Montana Con-
stitution by examining two categories: the protection of individual rights,
found mostly in Article II of the Montana Constitution, and the structure
and orderly functioning of the government, found in the remaining articles.
The Montana Constitution protects individual rights which have no
counterpart in the U.S. Constitution. Additionally, the Montana Constitu-
100. Diana S. Dowling, Implementation and Amendment of the 1972 Constitution, 51 Mont. L. Rev.
282 (1990).
101. James H. Goetz, Interpretations of the Montana Constitution: Sometimes Socratic, Sometimes
Erratic, 51 Mont. L. Rev. 289 (1990).
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tion includes some guarantees that, although similar to guarantees in the
U.S. Constitution, are interpreted independently by the Montana Supreme
Court. Montana has elevated the right of individual privacy compared to
other constitutional rights.10 2 Additionally, the right to observe governmen-
tal deliberations has a higher value in Montana than in the federal sys-
tem.10 Because the Montana Supreme Court places such a high value on
both the right to privacy and the right to know, it has struggled to reconcile
the conflicting provisions. Despite this, the Montana Constitution's decla-
ration of rights is known as one of the most stringent protectors of individ-
ual liberties.
The structure of the Montana Constitution is unique in various re-
spects. Its provisions regarding the environment and natural resources are
particularly distinctive. For example, it states that all people have the right
to "a clean and healthful environment." 10 4 Like its protections of individual
liberties, the structure of the Montana Constitution is also one of the most
progressive in the country.
Public Purpose and Economic Development: The Montana
Perspective 0 5-Mae Nan Ellingson & Jerry C.D. Mahoney
This article reviews Montana Supreme Court decisions applying the
1972 Montana Constitution's Public Purpose Clause in an attempt to draw
conclusions about permissible economic development activities for local
governments. The Clause provides that "taxes shall be levied by general
laws for public purposes."106 This provision is often equated with the Mon-
tana Constitution's Appropriation Clause. 107
The Montana Supreme Court issued conflicting opinions suggesting
what is and is not an economic program for a valid public purpose. For
example, in White v. State 0 8 and Hollow v. State,109 the Court suggested
that economic programs at issue were not for a public purpose under the
Public Purpose Clause of the Montana Constitution, although they were
markedly similar to an economic program that was upheld as a valid public
purpose in Fickes v. Missoula County.110 In order for Montana to improve
its business climate, the authors suggest that the Montana Supreme Court
102. Mont. Const. art. II, § 10.
103. Id. at art. II, § 9.
104. Id. at art. II, § 3.
105. Mae Nan Ellingson & Jerry C.D. Mahoney, Public Purpose and Economic Development: The
Montana Perspective, 51 Mont. L. Rev. 356 (1990).
106. Mont. Const. art. VIII, § 1.
107. Id. at art. V, § 11(5).
108. White v. State, 759 P.2d 971 (Mont. 1988).
109. Hollow v. State, 723 P.2d 227 (Mont. 1986).
110. Fickes v. Missoula Co., 470 P.2d 287 (Mont. 1970).
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either fully articulate its concept of public purposes or retreat from the stan-
dards set forth in Hollow and White.
Montana's Constitutionally Established Investment Program: A State
Investing Against Itself' "-Wendy A. Fitzgerald
This article explores how Montana's Constitutional provision on state
investment 1 2 has not been implemented as envisioned by the delegates who
created it in 1972. The delegates' goals for the investment program were
public accountability, instate investment, and prevention of state conflicts
of interest. The author looks at how progressive, populist, and conservative
influences shaped the article on state investment. Progressives wanted state
investment funds unified to give more control to the people, while populists
preferred state monies be invested in state enterprises, and conservatives
sought to prevent conflicts of interest arising out of state investment in and
regulation of Montana corporations.
The manner in which the Legislature has implemented the investment
program has failed to realize the delegates' goals. The Legislature adopted
a "prudent expert" standard by which the Board of Investments, a board of
financial experts the Legislature created to invest state funds, must abide.
Under this standard, there is no public accountability because the Board is
solely governed by the prudent expert standard; there is very little in-state
investment because greater returns can be found out of state; and conflicts
of interest have not been eliminated because the State can invest retirement
funds, which constitute a large portion of state investment funds, in corpo-
rate common stock. For example, Montana is invested in companies oper-
ating in the South African apartheid system. This is contrary to Montana's
constitutional provision on equal rights; yet, the Board of Investments suc-
cessfully argued the prudent expert standard precluded divestment from
South Africa. The author concludes that Montanans must demand the State
significantly alter its investment policies if the delegates' vision for state
investment is to be realized.
Revenue and Finance under Montana's 1972 Constitution 13-
Thomas E. Towe
This article discusses the changes made at the 1972 Constitutional
Convention to the revenue and finance portion of the Montana Constitution.
111. Wendy A. Fitzgerald, Montana's Constitutionally Established Investment Program: A State
Investing Against Itself, 51 Mont. L. Rev. 378 (1990).
112. Mont. Const. art. VII, § 13.
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The most significant change to the revenue and finance articlel 14 was the
equalization of property tax values to ensure an equal system of taxation
throughout Montana. Previously, counties were using only a fraction of
property values for taxation purposes, and this fraction varied among coun-
ties.
In addition, the Legislature was given the mandate to create a unified
investment program for public funds. Investment return, not being a main
consideration under the 1889 Constitution, became the primary factor by
which professional investors would determine how to invest state funds.
The limitations on state indebtedness were changed to allow a bond
issue to be approved by either a two-thirds vote of each house of the legisla-
ture, or by popular vote. The limitations on local debt were also changed,
but instead of proscribing rules and limitations, it was left to the Legislature
to address.
There were a number of changes made regarding tax-exempt property.
Most significantly, the Legislature was authorized to exempt any property it
wanted from taxation. The author concludes that because of its simplicity
and farsightedness, the revenue and finance article will serve Montanans
well into the future.
The Montana Constitution and the Right to a Clean and Healthful
Environment'1"5-Deborah Beaumont Schmidt &
Robert J. Thompson
This article describes how competing private and public values have
shaped the implementation of the Montana Constitution's guarantee to a
"clean and healthful environment."'H6 Much of the debate at the 1972 Con-
stitutional Convention focused on the clash between environmental protec-
tion and private property rights-a controversy that continues today.
The author lists four areas of environmental policy impacted by these
competing values. Legislation affecting Montana's water resources has at-
tempted to strike an acceptable balance between the interests of conserva-
tionists and landowners, primarily because Montanans want protection from
downstream threats. Similarly, Montana's mining laws are a fair balance
between those wanting to keep mining a central part of the economy and
those wanting to protect both public and private land from the abuses of
mining.
114. Mont. Const. art. Vill.
115. Deborah Beaumont Schmidt & Robert J. Thompson, The Montana Constitution and the Right
to a Clean and Healthful Environment, 51 Mont. L. Rev. 411 (1990).
116. Mont. Const. art. II, § 3.
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However, Montana's land use laws fail to strike an adequate balance
between public and private interests. Montanans are quick to regulate large
corporations; however, they are reluctant to regulate themselves. Small
scale mineral extraction and subdivisions are examples of where regulation
is lacking. The cumulative effects of this lack of regulation will be signifi-
cant. Non-point source pollution and the destruction of environmentally
sensitive areas will become a main source of pollution unless individuals
become better stewards of the land.
The regulation of individual action will become increasingly more im-
portant as large scale polluters become subject to stringent regulations and
the cumulative effects of individual action become a main source of envi-
ronmental degradation.
The Battle for the Environmental Provisions in Montana's 1972
Constitution' 17-C. Louise Cross
This article is based on a speech given by the author recalling her
efforts at the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention to obtain stronger
environmental protections in Montana's Constitution. The author was the
chairperson of the committee on natural resources and agriculture. Cross's
perseverance was critical in passing progressive environmental provisions.
At the Convention, the debate focused on two provisions: a public trust
provision and a citizens' right to sue provision. The debate over these pro-
visions was intense, with opponents labeling them takings of private prop-
erty. A member of Cross's committee went so far as to label the provisions
socialist, effectively killing them.
However, all was not lost. Cross was successful in getting a provision
passed that ensured land disturbed by mining activities would be reclaimed.
In addition, the right to a clean and healthful environment was included in
both the Bill of Rights and the natural resources article.
After the convention, another delegate told Cross that she should not
be disappointed in what she had accomplished at the Convention; there
were significant environmental protections added to the Constitution.
Looking back, she realized he was right.
The Judicial Article: What Went Wrong? 8-Jean M. Bowman
This article criticizes the Montana Constitution's judicial article. 119
The Judicial Article created at the 1972 Constitutional Convention does not
117. C. Louise Cross, The Battle for the Environmental Provisions in Montana's 1972 Constitution,
51 Mont. L. Rev. 449 (1990).
118. Jean M. Bowman, The Judicial Article: What Went Wrong, 51 Mont. L. Rev. 492 (1990).
119. Mont. Const. art. VII.
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vary significantly from the article in Montana's 1889 Constitution because
the delegates did not understand how to create an effective judiciary.
The section of the Judicial Article proscribing selection of judges is
problematic because it combines pure election with merit selection of
judges-a departure from the 1889 Constitution. The Governor makes an
appointment to fill a judicial vacancy, subject to senate confirmation, and in
the next election the voters determine whether to accept or reject the ap-
pointment. If the incumbent judge runs unopposed, he is subject to a yes or
no vote on whether he should be retained. Unfortunately, this election/se-
lection method has done little to preserve the electorate's voice in the pro-
cess since judges often run unopposed, and when there is another candidate,
incumbents typically win by large margins.
The section on removal and discipline grants authority to the Judicial
Standards Commission to censure members of the bar, and originally re-
quired that such proceedings be absolutely confidential. However, these
provisions have been weakened since their initial passage in 1972. Mon-
tana voters passed two subsequent amendments limiting the absolute confi-
dentiality requirement, and the Montana Supreme Court has placed some
limitations on the Commission's power.
The delegates to the 1972 Constitutional Convention created a judici-
ary comprised of semi-independent bodies, which has resulted in a terribly
inefficient judicial system that is in desperate need of change.
Classroom v. Courtroom: Is the Right to Education Fundamental?l20 -
Lori Anne Harper
This article criticizes the Montana Supreme Court's decision in State
ex. Rel. Bartness v. Board of Trustees121 for failing to explicitly state the
right to education is fundamental and for failing to recognize extracurricular
activities as a fundamental component of education. The Court recognized
various components of education could be deemed fundamental; however,
it failed to delineate which components are fundamental. It did, however,
conclude that extracurricular activities are not a fundamental component of
education.
The author's disagreement with this decision is based on information
contained in the transcripts from the 1972 Constitutional Convention. The
transcripts show the delegates recognized the overriding importance of edu-
cation and intended to create an educational provision 2 2 that expressed the
120. Lori Anne Harper, Classroom v. Courtroom - Is the Right to Education Fundamental?, 51
Mont. L. Rev. 509 (1990).
121. State ex. Rel. Bartness v. Bd. of Trustees, 726 P.2d 801 (1986).
122. Mont. Const. art. X, § 1.
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value of activities both inside and outside the classroom. The delegates
believed quality, equality, and flexibility are crucial to a solid education.
Accordingly, the delegates intended to make the right to education funda-
mental.
The Court missed an opportunity to implement the delegates' intent for
public education. The author concludes that the Education Clause should
be clarified to clearly reflect the right to an education is in fact a fundamen-
tal right.
King's Resurrection: Sovereign Immunity Returns to Montana 123
John A. Kutzman
This comment argues that the 1972 Constitution's abrogation of sover-
eign immunity124 was eviscerated by a series of cases improperly decided
by the Montana Supreme Court. Sovereign immunity-the ability of the
government or governmental officials to claim immunity from civil suit-
was abrogated by Article II, § 18 of the 1972 Montana Constitution. The
constitutional convention delegates wanted to abolish sovereign immunity
because they viewed it as unfair that citizens could not seek redress for
injuries merely because the government was an adverse party.
However, in 1974 the voters amended this provision to give the Legis-
lature the ability to make exceptions to the constitutional abrogation of sov-
ereign immunity by a two-thirds vote of each house. Following this amend-
ment, in 1977 the Legislature enacted reforms of Article II, § 18 that in-
cluded damage caps and immunity statutes. Additionally, the Legislature in
1977 extended sovereign immunity to protect legislative acts.
Although this reform covered only legislative acts, and not administra-
tive ones, the Montana Supreme Court erred by shielding administrative
acts from suit as well. For example, the Court found a school janitor's
negligent failure to remove snow and ice from a stairwell was a legislative
act because the school board failed to appropriate the necessary funds for
the school's upkeep. 125 Because the Montana Supreme Court refused to
distinguish between administrative acts and legislative acts, the Court effec-
tively re-imposed blanket sovereign immunity and likely contravened the
Montana Constitution.
123. John A. Kutzman, King's Resurrection: Sovereign Immunity Returns to Montana, 51 Mont. L.
Rev. 529 (1990).
124. Mont. Const. art. II, §18.
125. State ex rel. Eccleston v. Dist. Ct., 783 P. 2d 363 (Mont. 1989).
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Untouched Protection from Discrimination: Private Action in Montana's
Individual Dignity Clausel26-Tia Rikel Robbin
This comment explores the Dignity Clause127 of the 1972 Constitution
and its attempts to end public as well as private discrimination in Montana.
Going beyond the U.S. Constitution, the Montana Dignity Clause specifi-
cally provides that "neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or
institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil
or political rights on account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or
condition, or political or religious ideas." 2 8
Before the adoption of this provision, Montanans relied on the 14th
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and anti-discrimination provisions de-
rived from the 1889 Montana Constitution. The problem, however, was
that there was no protection from state or private discrimination. Though
the Montana clause was designed to provide a higher level of protection
from discrimination for its citizens, its language was too broad to effec-
tively carry out this task. However, instead of focusing on its limitations,
courts should embrace the broad language of the Dignity Clause and extend
its protection to as many situations as possible. Doing so would not only
provide the highest level of protection for Montanans, but would also im-
plement the express intentions of the 1972 drafters.
Privatization of the Water Resource: Salvage, Leases, and Changesl29
Albert W. Stone
The 1972 Montana Constitution provides, "all . . . waters within the
boundaries of the state are the property of the state for the use of its people
and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law." 30
In this comment, the author questions the validity of two substantial
changes to Montana water law during the 1991 biennial legislative session:
(1) the incentive to salvage water through water-saving methods and (2)
allowing temporary or intermittent changes and the re-allocation of water.
The 1991 legislation went further than merely allowing changes in
water rights; this new statute permitted creation of new water rights with
earlier priority dates. As a result, the water would become a private com-
modity instead of a public resource. Furthermore, the legislation allowed
126. Tia Rikel Robbin, Untouched Protection from Discrimination: Private Action in Montana's
Individual Dignity Clause, 51 Mont. L. Rev. 553 (1990).
127. Mont. Const. art. II, § 4.
128. Id.
129. Albert W. Stone, Privatization of the Water Resource: Salvage, Leases, and Changes, 54 Mont.
L. Rev. 99 (1993).
130. Mont. Const. art. IX, § 3(3).
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old appropriators to market their surplus water, meaning the water would
cease to be public property. Under this system, water is treated as an eco-
nomic commodity in the free market. With such a change, an important
policy issue arises: whether a water right should be capable of conferring
exclusive private ownership over a public resource.
Comments on Government Censorship and Secrecyl3 1-Larry M. Elison
& Deborah E. Elison
This comment examines the extent to which the public has a right to
know and to speak out against the government's power to censor and con-
ceal. Montana is only one of four states to have an explicit constitutional
provision for the right to know. But Montana is the only state that does not
limit such a right with broad exceptions that tend to infringe on this right.
As a result, Montana appears to provide the public more of a constitutional
right to know than any other state. However, even with such a clear posi-
tion in its Constitution, several statutory provisions remain on the books
that purport to limit the public's right to know. While the Montana Su-
preme Court has found some of these statutory restrictions to be unconstitu-
tional, the Court has failed to consider the historical justification for a right
to know and it has failed to analyze the statutes in a consistent manner.
Article II, § 9 of the Montana Constitution specifically states only one ex-
ception to the public's right to know: "[C]ases in which the demand of
individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure." To be
clear, individual privacy does not extend to the government or corporations.
It is only when an individual's privacy is at risk that a right to know may be
restricted. However, the balance is generally tipped in favor of disclosure.
Montana Supreme Court Unnecessarily Misconstrues Takings Lawl32 -
John L. Horwich & Hertha L. Lund
This comment argues the Montana Supreme Court erred in Kudloff v.
City of Billingsl33 by engaging in an improper takings analysis. The
Court's takings analysis oversimplified and mischaracterized takings juris-
prudence under both the U.S. Constitution and the Montana Constitution.
The plaintiff, who owned 133 acres of land near the Billings airport,
had originally been allowed to develop a portion of his property for a ski
area. However, he was unable to obtain the necessary financing. When the
131. Larry M. Elison & Deborah E. Elison, Comments on Government Censorship and Secrecy, 55
Mont. L. Rev. 175 (1994).
132. John L. Horwich & Hertha L. Lund, Montana Supreme Court Unnecessarily Misconstrues
Takings Law, 55 Mont. L. Rev. 455 (1994).
133. Kudloff v. City of Billings, 860 P. 2d 140 (Mont. 1993).
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city of Billings annexed the plaintiff's land, he filed suit claiming the city
violated state statutes and his constitutional rights.
Though the Montana Supreme Court reached the correct result in
Kudloff, the Court improperly addressed his takings claim. The Kudloff
Court erred by holding a compensable taking did not occur because the
annexation did not deprive the plaintiffs property of all economically bene-
ficial uses. This holding mischaracterized takings jurisprudence at both the
state and federal levels by oversimplifying prior precedent and incorrectly
applying it to this case. Neither federal takings jurisprudence nor Supreme
Court precedent suggest a property owner must be deprived of all economi-
cally beneficial uses of his property to have a valid claim. Furthermore,
unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Montana Constitution requires just com-
pensation for either taking private property or damaging it. 134 Thus, the
takings language under the Montana Constitution apparently requires com-
pensation for a regulatory taking even though the property owner is not
deprived of all economically beneficial uses of his property.
Montana's Environmental Quality Provisions: Self-Execution or Self-
Delusionl3 5-John L. Horwich
This article examines whether the environmental quality provisions set
forth in the Montana Constitution1 3 6 are self-executing. To be self-execut-
ing, the Constitution's environmental quality provisions must establish le-
gally enforceable rights and obligations the judiciary could enforce without
further action by the Legislature. However, in deciding whether these pro-
visions are self-executing, a traditional self-execution analysis is inadequate
because it does not address the complexities and nuances of the Montana
Constitution's environmental quality provisions.
Under Article II, § 3 of the Montana Constitution, citizens possess cer-
tain inalienable rights including "the right to a clean and healthful environ-
ment." Defining terms such as "clean" and "healthful" proves difficult be-
cause these terms are vague. Applying this particular clause to a case
would be equally difficult because the clause is silent as to remedies and
enforcement. Additionally, it is unclear against whom the provisions are
enforceable and whether they could be applied to private parties or merely
the government. Article IX's environmental provisions also provide little in
the way of judicially enforceable obligations.
134. Mont. Const. art. II, § 29.
135. John L. Horwich, Montana's Environmental Quality Provisions: Self-Execution or Self-
Delusion, 57 Mont. L. Rev. 323 (1996).
136. Mont. Const. art. II, § 3; Mont. Const. art. IX, § 1.
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Though Montana's environmental quality provisions do not expressly
provide for judicially enforceable obligations, their presence in the Consti-
tution should not be undervalued. The right to a clean and healthful envi-
ronment indeed exists by virtue of this right's inclusion in the Constitution.
Therefore, government officials as well as private citizens have an obliga-
tion to respect that right to the best of their ability. Moreover, government
action may be informed and guided by the environmental rights contained
in the Constitution.
Civil Practice in Montana's People's Courts: The Proposed Montana
Justice and City Court Rules of Civil Procedure 137
Cynthia Ford
This article highlights the importance of having clear procedural rules
for Montana's justice and city courts. It also gives an overview of the pro-
posed rules that were to update the 1990 version of the Montana Justice
Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Many of the parties in justice and city
courts are not represented by practicing attorneys, and the outcomes of
these proceedings are decided by justices of the peace, many of whom do
not have a formal legal education. Providing these "people's courts" with
clear procedural rules is essential given their large caseload, and because
they play a pivotal role for many Montanans as courts of first and last re-
sort.
Article VII, § 5 of the 1972 Montana Constitution carried on the tradi-
tion of maintaining the justice courts system from the 1889 Constitution.
City courts as well as municipal courts were also authorized under the 1972
Constitution.' 3 8 These courts had been heavily criticized for their poor
quality during the 1960s; however, the drafters kept the constitutionally
mandated justice courts and permitted the Legislature to decide whether to
abolish city courts. The criticism effectively raised the importance of im-
proving these courts. In addition to enhancing the training and education of
judges, the necessity of improving the rules of procedure for these courts
was recognized. In 1982, the Montana Supreme Court enacted the first ver-
sion of the Montana Justice Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Over time,
though, as these courts faced a significant increase in their civil case loads,
it became clear the rules would need to be updated. In 1990, these rules
were updated and expanded. The remainder of this article provides an over-
view of the rules proposed in 1997 to replace the 1990 rules.
137. Cynthia Ford, Civil Practice in Montana's People's Courts: The Proposed Montana Justice
and City Court Rules of Civil Procedure, 58 Mont. L. Rev. 197 (1997).
138. Mont. Const. art. VII, §5.
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Voters Wisely Reject Proposed Constitutional Amendment 30 to Eliminate
the Montana Board of Regents 13 9-David Aronofsky
The 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention dramatically changed
higher education by removing its control from the executive and legislative
branches and placing its governance in the hands of the politically autono-
mous Board of Regents. 140 Before the creation of the Board, higher educa-
tion in Montana was largely considered a failure and was marked by politi-
cal meddling, a lack of academic freedom, and ineffective leadership.
Despite improvements to the system, the Board of Regents remained
highly controversial. In 1996, Constitutional Amendment 30 sought to
eliminate the Board of Regents and place a Department of Education within
the executive branch. The Amendment was ultimately rejected by voters
but efforts continued to weaken if not eliminate the Board.
This article presents a comparative analysis of Montana's governance
of higher education with higher education systems across the nation and
reviews arguments for and against an autonomous higher education sys-
tem. It concludes that Montana voters were smart to reject Constitutional
Amendment 30 and retain the autonomous Board of Regents.
Parental Notification of Abortion and Minors' Rights under the Montana
Constitution1 4 '-Matthew B. Hayhurst
This article explores whether parental notification laws are unconstitu-
tional in Montana. In 1995, the Montana Legislature passed the Parental
Notification of Abortion Act. Dr. Susan Wickland believed the law pro-
vided an inadequate judicial bypass and challenged it under the U.S. Consti-
tution but did not challenge it under the Montana Constitution. Wickland's
case went to the U.S. Supreme Court where the law was upheld.
The result may have been different if argued under Montana's Consti-
tution. The 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention was concerned about
unequal application of rights for minors, so delegates included a provision
that stated rights between adults and minors would be equal unless a law
was specifically devised to enhance the protection of minors.142
When the Montana Supreme Court first interpreted this provision in In
Re C.H., it developed a four-part test to determine when a law targeting
139. David Aronofsky, Voters Wisely Reject Proposed Constitutional Amendment 30 to Eliminate
the Montana Board of Regents, 58 Mont. L. Rev. 333 (1997).
140. Mont. Const. art. X, § 9(2)(a).
141. Matthew B. Hayhurst, student author, Parental Notification of Abortion and Minors' Rights
under the Montana Constitution, 58 Mont. L. Rev. 565 (1997).
142. Mont. Const. art. II, § 15.
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minors was valid. 143 If the four-part test was applied to the Parental Notifi-
cation of Abortion Act, the Court would determine the law violates a mi-
nor's right to privacy. Furthermore, the legislative history demonstrates the
Act was not intended to protect minors but to protect "the sanctity of the
traditional family structure." Since the law's violation does not enhance the
protection of a minor, the Court would find it unconstitutional.
Erger v. Askren: Protecting the Biological Parent's Rights at the Child's
Expense 144-Heather M. Latino
This casenote reviews the Montana Supreme Court's decision in Erger
v. Askren.145 In that case, a biological father sought custody of his child
from a stepfather. The district court applied the "best interest of the child"
test and awarded custody to the stepfather.
The Montana Supreme Court reversed, determining that the best inter-
est of the child test inadequately considered the constitutional and parental
rights of a biological father. In examining parental rights, the Supreme
Court relied exclusively on U.S. Supreme Court precedent rather than inter-
preting the Montana Constitution.
While acknowledging the existence of parental rights, the Court failed
to consider rights of the child. The Montana Constitution provides children
and adults identical rights, and because minors enjoy these equalized rights,
the Court should have looked to the child's rights as well.14 6 By only con-
sidering the father's rights and not weighing them against the child's rights,
Erger is a flawed opinion.
The Last Best Place to Die: Physician-Assisted Suicide and Montana's
Constitutional Right to Personal Autonomy Privacy'47 -
Scott A. Fisk
This article discusses whether physician-assisted suicide is constitu-
tionally protected under Montana's right to privacy.148 In writing the Mon-
tana Constitution, the 1972 Constitutional Convention delegates included a
right to privacy to create a "semi-permeable wall" between the individual
and the State. The provision expresses the State's cultural tradition of per-
sonal autonomy.
143. In Re C.H., 683 P.2d 931, 938-941 (Mont. 1984).
144. Heather M. Latino, student author, Erger v. Askren: Protecting the Biological Parent's Rights
at the Child's Expense, 58 Mont. L. Rev. 599 (1997).
145. Erger v. Askren, 919 P.2d 388 (Mont. 1996).
146. Mont. Const. art. II, § 15.
147. Scott A. Fisk, The Last Best Place to Die: Physician-Assisted Suicide and Montana's
Constitutional Right to Personal Autonomy Privacy, 59 Mont. L. Rev. 301 (1998).
148. Mont. Const. II, § 10.
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The Montana Supreme Court has interpreted the state right to privacy
to be stronger and broader than the federal privacy right recognized by the
United States Supreme Court. This became clear after Gryczan v.
State,149 where the Montana Supreme Court found the right to privacy pro-
tects homosexual sodomy. By contrast, the United States Supreme Court
found in Bowers v. Hardwicko50 that sodomy is not protected.
While the United States Supreme Court has not held there is not a right
to die, Montana's strong right to privacy and uniquely independent culture
may lead the Montana Supreme Court to find such a right.
Face to Face: The Crime Lab Exceptions of Rule 803(8) of the Montana
Rules of Evidence and the Montana Confrontation Clause 51-
Nicholas J. Weilhammer
This article discusses State v. Clark152 where the Montana Supreme
Court found Montana Rule of Evidence 803(8)153 violated Montana's Con-
frontation Clause. 154 Rule 803(8) was a hearsay exception that allowed
state crime laboratory reports to be admitted without the author testifying.
The Court ruled this was unconstitutional because 803(8) prevented the de-
fendant from meeting his accuser face to face. Such archaic language is
unsuitable for modern times.
While Montana's Confrontation Clause was supposed to mirror the
United States Constitution's, a majority of federal courts have ruled lab
reports are admissible. Missouri and Nebraska have nearly identical provi-
sions as Montana, but interpret theirs in accordance with the United States
Supreme Court. Despite the similar language, the Montana Supreme Court
unjustifiably diverges from other courts.
The Court in Clark was concerned with 803(8) not allowing the defen-
dant an opportunity to cross examine the forensic scientist who prepared the
report. While cross-examination is a vehicle for producing truth, the lab
reports are not based on opinion but objective fact. Based on the circum-
stances, cross-examination provides little utility.
The language of Montana's Confrontation Clause should be modern-
ized. Technology provides methods that make it unnecessary for all wit-
nesses to testify, and amending the Confrontation Clause would allow
judges to determine when a witness' testimony is necessary.
149. Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997).
150. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
151. Nicholas J. Weilhanmer, Face to Face: The Crime Lab Exceptions of Rule 803(8) of the
Montana Rules of Evidence and the Montana Confrontation Clause, 60 Mont. L. Rev. 167 (1999).
152. State v. Clark, 964 P.2d 766 (Mont. 1998).
153. Mont. R. Evid. 803(8) (1997).
154. Mont. Const. art. II, § 24.
544 Vol. 71
42
Montana Law Review, Vol. 71 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol71/iss2/10
ARTICLES ON THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION
Privacy in Cyberspace: Transcripts from the 1999 Judge James R.
Browning Symposium 1 55- Jeff Renz (moderator), Panelists:
James Harvey, Larry Elison, Nancy Sinclair,
Chris Tweeten, & Orson Swindle
Montana has a strong right to privacy.15 6 How this right to privacy
applies to internet usage and computers is still unknown. There are no
court cases in Montana where the Court has faced a question about law
enforcement using the tools of subpoenas and search warrants to obtain
information stored on a computer.
The use of these tools has been limited by Montana's right to privacy.
In State v. Nelson, the Court ruled for a subpoena submitted to a third party
to be valid, the State must have probable cause before issuing the sub-
poena.157 Otherwise, the subpoena violates an individual's right to privacy.
This may be problematic in cases where an adult solicits a minor on-
line. "Fingerprints" are left every time an individual visits a website, and in
solicitation cases, law enforcement subpoenas the internet service provider
to obtain the "fingerprint" records. Whether this is constitutional in Mon-
tana is debatable.
While the Court has never directly answered the question, the Court
has found that a reasonable expectation of privacy does not exist for tele-
phone and electric records. If the Court were to apply the same reasoning
to an internet case and determine there was no reasonable expectation of
privacy for internet records, the subpoenaing of internet records would be
constitutional.
Some Thoughts on the Meaning and Scope of the Montana Constitution's
"Dignity" Clause with Possible Applications15 8 -
Matthew 0. Clifford & Thomas P. Huff
This article explores the necessity of the Dignity Clause, as well as the
purpose and unique meaning of the Dignity Clause of the Montana Consti-
tution. While the conception of human dignity extends as far back as the
Reformation era of the 14th and 15th centuries, it wasn't until the 19th
century that our democratic government began using "dignity" as a means
of enforcing such ideas as tolerance, justice, and fairness. Using the Dig-
155. Jeff Renz (moderator), Panelists: James Harvey, Larry Elison, Nancy Sinclair, Chris Tweeten,
& Orson Swindle, Privacy in Cyberspace: Transcripts from the 1999 Judge James R. Browning
Symposium, 61 Mont. L. Rev. 43 (2000).
156. Mont. Const. art. I, § 10.
157. State v. Nelson, 941 P.2d 441, 450 (Mont. 1997).
158. Matthew 0. Clifford & Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts on the Meaning and Scope of the
Montana Constitution's Dignity Clause with Possible Applications, 61 Mont. L. Rev. 301 (2000).
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nity Clause of the Puerto Rican Constitution as its primary model, Montana
instituted a Dignity Clause into its Constitution in 1972.
Although the Dignity Clause can be interpreted as a means of filling in
the gaps of constitutionally protected rights, there are limitations to its ap-
plication. One such limitation is that a Dignity Clause violation must be
significant enough to offend a person's sense of humanity through the re-
duction of his worth as a human being. The Dignity Clause has been ap-
plied by United States Supreme Court in cases involving the mentally hand-
icapped (Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center159), gay and lesbian rights
(Romer v. Evans160), and abortion (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey161).
While it is undisputed that the Montana Constitution's Dignity Clause
supports the ideal "that the dignity of the human being is inviolable,"1 6 2 the
Montana Supreme Court denied an invitation to address the Dignity Clause
in the Gryczanl63 case, and instead opted to use the Privacy Clause as the
basis for its opinion. The groundwork for the Dignity Clause has been es-
tablished; it is now up to the Montana Supreme Court to continue interpret-
ing and defining the scope and meaning of this clause.
Something Upon Which We Can All Agree: Requiring a Unanimous Jury
Verdict in Criminal Cases '6-Brian M. Morris
This article explores the constitutionality of a "general unanimity" jury
instruction. The article raises the question: To what extent must a jury
unanimously agree on the details of a crime rather than the simple issue of
guilt or innocence? In 1981, the Montana Supreme Court ruled that a jury
does not have to agree unanimously on the specific mental state controlling
the defendant's conduct.
When the relevant statute provides for alternative means of committing
the particular offense, must the jury agree unanimously as to which means
the defendant used? In State v. Weaver,16 5 the Montana Supreme Court
reversed the defendant's conviction based on the uncertainty caused by the
general unanimity instruction regarding specific counts, reasoning that a
specific unanimity instruction was necessary to satisfy the fairness of the
159. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
160. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
161. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 503 U.S. 833 (1992).
162. Id. at 316.
163. Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997).
164. Brian M. Morris, Something Upon Which We Can All Agree: Requiring a Unanimous Jury
Verdict in Criminal Cases, 62 Mont. L, Rev. 1 (2001).
165. State v. Weaver, 964 P.2d 713 (Mont. 1998).
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defendant's trial. In State v. Harris,16 6 the Court followed the course set
out in Weaver, stating that "the jury is to be instructed that it must reach a
unanimous verdict on at least one specific act for each count."1 6 7
Along with the constitutional issues raised in regards to general versus
specific unanimity instructions, specific unanimity instructions help to elim-
inate jury confusion and give focus to the jury's deliberations. While such
specific instructions may cause slight delays in our justice system, protect-
ing the defendant's right to a unanimous verdict, as guaranteed by the Con-
stitutions of Montana and United States, are of the utmost concern and im-
portance.
Good Riddance to Good Faith?: Deciphering Montana's New Test for
Subfacial Challenges to Search Warrant Affidavits' 6 8 -
Peter William Mickelson
This comment discusses Montana's departure from the federally ac-
cepted Franks test. Arising from the United States Supreme Court case,
Franks v. Delaware,16 9 the Franks test requires a defendant to show that an
affidavit statement was "deliberately false or made with reckless disregard
for the truth." 70 With the decision of State v. Worrall,171 this requirement
was eliminated by the Montana Supreme Court. Now, defendants may
challenge warrants solely on inaccuracies in supporting affidavits. The au-
thor questions whether Montana's departure from the Franks test was nec-
essary, reasonable, or compatible with Montana policy. He argues that, be-
cause the Montana Supreme Court's interpretations of the search and
seizure procedures mostly mirror those of the United States Supreme Court,
it was inconsequential to refashion the Franks test in favor of criminal de-
fendants.
With the Worrall decision, it has been confirmed that the Montana
Supreme Court indeed interprets probable cause and the exclusionary rule
differently than the federal courts. In modifying the Franks test, Worrall
further attempts to shape federal search and seizure doctrines to comply
with the Privacy and Warranty Clauses of the Montana Constitution. How-
ever, while Montana has stricter constitutional rules regarding searches and
seizures, as well as a more comprehensive review than that required by the
166. State v. Harris, 983 P.2d 881 (Mont. 1999).
167. Weaver, 964 P.2d 713 at 721.
168. Peter William Mickelson, Good Riddance to Good Faith?: Deciphering Montana's New Test
for Subfacial Challenges to Search Warrant Affidavits, 62 Mont. L. Rev. 175 (2001).
169. Franks v. Del., 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
170. Id. at 176.
171. State v. Worall, 976 P.2d 968 (Mont. 1999).
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federal constitution, the author remains skeptical of the Montana Supreme
Court's decision to create a new precedent within this field of law.
MEIC v. DEQ: An Inadequate Effort to Address the Meaning of
Montana's Constitutional Environmental Provisions 7 2
John L. Horwich
This article criticizes the nature of the Montana Supreme Court's anal-
ysis in Montana Environmental Information Center v. Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality.17 3 This case, the first to interpret the environmental
provisions included in Montana's 1972 Constitution, stemmed from DEQ's
approval of the Seven-Up Pete Joint Venture's proposal of the McDonald
Gold Mine Project (near Lincoln, Montana). The mine required water to be
pumped out and discharged away from the site. Upon evaluation of the
water, it was found the pumped water contained a higher concentration of
arsenic than the water into which it would be discharged.
Montana's nondegradation policy prohibits the degradation of high-
quality waters, which disallows pumped water to be discharged into water
of a higher quality. However, this policy does not go without exceptions.
The plaintiffs initiated suit against DEQ on the premise that the statutory
nondegradation exemptions allowed by Montana's degradation policy vio-
late the Montana Constitution's environmental provisions.
The Montana Supreme Court analyzed the case by addressing issues of
constitutionality. The Court concluded that "the right to a clean and health-
ful environment" guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights in Article II, § 3
is a fundamental right. 1 74 Fundamental rights can only be denied if the
actor who is denying the right has a compelling state interest to do so. To
aid in their analysis, the Court relied heavily on the intent of those who
wrote and voted for the 1972 Montana Constitution.
After a lengthy analysis of the case, the Court concluded that arbitrary
exclusions permitted by the policy violate the rights guaranteed by the
Montana Constitution. It remanded the case to the district court to be ana-
lyzed under strict scrutiny. The district court held the case moot, leaving
the constitutionality of the nondegradation exemptions undetermined.
172. John L. Horwich, MEIC v. DEQ: An Inadequate Effort to Address the Meaning of Montana's
Constitutional Environmental Provisions, 62 Mont. L. Rev. 269 (2001).
173. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1999).
174. Id. at 275.
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"No Armed Bodies of Men"-Montana's Forgotten Constitutional Right
(With Some Passing Notes on Recent Environmental Rights
Cases) 175-Robert G. Natelson
This article explores the constitutionality of permitting out-of-state
armed bodies of men into Montana for the preservation of peace. In July of
2000, without the authority of the Legislature or Governor, Missoula city
police imported approximately seventy-six outside police officers to aid lo-
cal law enforcement during a visit by the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club.
Article II, § 33 of the Montana Constitution states that no armed persons
"or armed body of men shall be brought into this state for the preservation
of the peace . . . except upon the application of the legislature, or of the
governor when the legislature cannot be convened."176
The mayor of Missoula appointed a committee to investigate the inci-
dent that occurred between in-state and out-of-state law enforcement of-
ficers. The committee found the provision only applied to importations by
private parties and that the Montana Interstate Law Enforcement Mutual
Aid Act provided the necessary authority for the importation.177
Article II, § 33 does not state whether the provision applies to both
public and private parties. The article explores the validity of the commit-
tee's decision based on historical and facial context. Because provisions in
the Montana Declaration of Rights usually pertain to fundamental citizen
rights against the government, government infringement of Article II, § 33
would only seem to be valid if it serves a compelling state interest.
The Issues of E-Mail Privacy and Cyberspace Personal Jurisdiction:
What Clients Need to Know about Two Practical
Constitutional Questions Regarding the
Internet 78-Mark S. Kende
This article addresses the constitutionality of employers monitoring
employee e-mail on work computers. While jurisdictions in other states
have granted employers such a right, the Montana Constitution contains
stronger privacy and dignity provisions than those found in the U.S. Consti-
tution and in other state constitutions.
175. Robert Natelson, "No Armed Bodies of Men"-Montanans' Forgotten Constitutional Right, 63
Mont. L. Rev. 1 (2002).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Mark Kende, The Issues of E-Mail Privacy and Cyberspace Personal Jurisdiction: What
Clients Need to Know About Two Practical Constitutional Questions Regarding the Internet, 63 Mont.
L. Rev. 301 (2002).
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While the Montana Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of em-
ployer monitoring of employee e-mail, the author argues that employees
might have greater legal recourse in Montana than in other states. In the
recent Montana case of State v. Siegal,"9 the Montana Supreme Court held
that police-use of thermal imaging was a search because it infringed upon a
person's right to privacy. In Siegal, the Court discussed the 1972 Montana
Constitution Convention and how the privacy provision was adopted largely
to protect people's privacy rights in regard to "computerized data banks"180
and other modem technologies.
This article also addresses the role of personal jurisdiction in cyber-
space. Personal jurisdiction rests on the assertion that the defendant is suf-
ficiently "present" within the forum state. 8 1 The trouble begins with trying
to assign a website a specific location. A lot of controversy surrounds the
cases that have confronted this issue. While several Ninth Circuit Court
decisions suggest varying opinions on this issue, the decision in Bedrejo v.
Triple E Canada, Ltd.1a2 supports the conclusion that the Montana Supreme
Court is hesitant to subject out-of-state companies to Montana jurisdiction,
unless for reasons other than operating a website that is accessible to Mon-
tana residents.
The Montana Constitution: A National Perspective 18 3-G. Alan Tarr
This article paints a picture about how the regional and national con-
text shaped the 1972 Montana Constitution during its drafting. The article
is broken into three sections. The first section discusses the development of
the Montana Constitution from a regional perspective, the second section
discusses the development from a national perspective, and the final section
discusses the creation of the 1972 Montana Constitution.
Montana was one of six states to enter into the Union in 1889. This
group of states was the largest to adopt their first constitutions in a single
year since 1776.184 Montana did not amend its Constitution nearly as many
times as some of its neighbors. However, it did share flaws borrowed from
other constitutions. Such flaws included fragmented executive branches
and impossibly short and infrequent legislative sessions. Even with these
problems, Montana is the only state out of the six that was able to overhaul
its Constitution, rather than simply adding more and more amendments.
179. State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176 (Mont. 1997).
180. Id. at 191.
181. Kende, supra n. 178, at 320.
182. Bedrejo v. Triple E Can., Ltd., 984 P.2d 739 (1999).
183. G. Alan Tarr, The Montana Constitution: A National Perspective, 64 Mont. L. Rev. 1 (2003).
184. Id. at 2.
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Only two other states have newer constitutions than Montana. How-
ever, Montana was jumping on the bandwagon when it revised its own Con-
stitution because the majority of states had already changed their original
constitutions at least once. This indicates that Americans think differently
about their state constitutions than they do about the federal Constitution.
Americans scrapping the federal Constitution and starting over seems quite
unlikely.
The final section of the article discusses the provisions that the 100
delegates used as a starting point, as well as the new provisions inspired by
the times, and by trial and error in the past. In summary-the Montana
Constitution was not drafted in a vacuum.
The State of the Montana Constitution (Turkey Feathers on the
Constitutional Eagle)' 8 5-Gregory J. Petesch
The unusual name of this article comes straight from the words of a
Constitutional Convention delegate. Delegate J.C. Garlington stated that
the new 1972 Montana Constitution should consist of a basic fundamental
framework for a functioning government, and the delegates should not try
to make it more by trying "to stick turkey feathers into the constitutional
eagle."' 86
This article begins with a discussion of several of the provisions that
shaped the structure of the government and why those provisions were in-
cluded. Several provisions were inserted or moved to appease those whose
votes the Legislature needed to ratify the newly drafted Constitution, such
as county officials. Some of the decisions to include provisions, like
enumerating elected county officials and enumerating the then existing
county form of government, have led to struggles between the counties and
the Legislature.
Next, the article discusses the size limitations imposed on the Senate
and the House of Representatives and the impact of reapportionment and
redistricting plans on those numbers. Comically or tragically, depending on
one's perspective, the education provisions seemed to cause as much confu-
sion regarding funding and appropriate structure at the time they were in-
cluded as they do now. The author discusses several Montana Supreme
Court decisions that deal directly with these provisions. The remainder of
the article focuses on the changes that Montanans have made to the Consti-
tution through the initiative and referendum processes. The article closes
185. Gregory J. Petsch, The State of the Montana Constitution (Turkey Feathers on the
Constitutional Eagle), 64 Mont. L. Rev. 23 (2003).
186. Mont. Const. Cony. Procs., vol. VII, 2260 (1971-1972).
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by noting that the political climate will continue to shape our Montana Con-
stitution.
Signature Gathering in the Initiative Process: How Democratic is
it?' 87-Richard J. Ellis
The author argues the signature gathering phase of the initiative pro-
cess needs greater scrutiny by not only the voters, but also the media, state
elections officials, and scholars. A bit of romance exists in the notion that
the initiative process is the ultimate form of democracy, with individuals
braving the elements to collect signatures for their cause. The unfortunate
truth, however, is that the initiative and signature gathering process is in-
creasingly becoming a business to some, and those braving the elements to
gather signatures are more likely hired-guns, paid per signature, rather than
ideological community members fighting for their cause.
One major problem with this development is, unlike election cam-
paigns where limits are in place as to how much one can donate to a candi-
date, no similar restrictions exist on the initiative process. Another issue
with initiatives is, unlike the election process, where a candidate is selected
by his party and must win a primary election prior to appearing on the
general election ballot, initiatives undergo no such popular scrutiny. Al-
though the voters ultimately decide the issue, whether the issue passes often
depends on how the proposition is worded. For example people respond
much more favorably to allowing terminally ill patients to "die with dig-
nity" than they do to "physician assisted suicide."
This article closely examines the nuances of the signature gathering
process. Not only is this article an eye-opener, it is extremely informative
as to how this mysterious process really works and the history behind its
development.
The Right to Privacy Under the Montana Constitution: Sex and
Intimacy I8 -Patricia Cain
This article explores how the legal concept of privacy applies to sexual
intimacy under the Montana Constitution. The article also asserts that
Montana's recognition of a privacy right for sexual intimacy in the
Gryczanl89 case should inform interpretations of privacy under the federal
Constitution, and that the United States Supreme Court should declare the
187. Richard J. Ellis, Signature Gathering in the Initiative Process: How Democratic is it?, 64 Mont.
L. Rev. 35 (2003).
188. Patricia Cain, The Right to Privacy Under the Montana Constitution: Sex and Intimacy, 64
Mont. L. Rev. 99 (2003).
189. Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (1997).
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right of privacy in sexual intimacy as a fundamental right. In Gryczan, the
Montana Supreme Court held that Montana's constitutional right of privacy
included the right of same-sex, consenting adults to engage in non-commer-
cial, private, sexual relations.190
The reasoning used in Gryczan has been criticized for applying the
Privacy Clause rather than the Dignity Clause of the Montana Constitution.
The author argues that the Montana Supreme Court correctly reasoned that
privacy, not dignity, was the correct justification for its conclusion because
sexual intimacy is a relational interest in developing one's selfhood, which
requires privacy. Privacy includes both the literal and metaphorical space
upon which the government may not intrude. Within this literal and meta-
phorical space, which is protected by the legal concept of privacy, an indi-
vidual creates self. Protection of this self-creating space is necessary for the
full development of an individual's self and necessary for avoiding the ills
of social conformity.
Finally, the author argues that the United States Supreme Court should
declare a right to sexual intimacy as a fundamental privacy right under the
federal Constitution because most states protect sexual intimacy, and it is
fundamentally unfair for a person's rights to sexual intimacy to change sig-
nificantly when the person crosses state lines.
The Dignity Clause of the Montana Constitution: May Foreign
Jurisprudence Lead the Way to an Expanded
Interpretation?19 1-Heinz Klug
Following the Second World War, several constitutions included
clauses that protect human dignity. Countries such as Germany and South
Africa have developed jurisprudence around their dignity provisions, which
may help Montana litigants and courts address and define the meaning of
the Montana Constitution's Dignity Clause. Human dignity is the core
principle of human rights; it creates in people a sense of self worth. A
constitutionally protected right to dignity is different. Constitutional dig-
nity manifests in specific fact circumstances-like the death penalty, volun-
tary enslavement, or assisted suicide-and requires specific legal remedies.
Human dignity could be constitutionally recognized in five distinct
forms of a right. First, dignity could be a classic individual right, which
would combine with other constitutional rights to protect an individual's
privacy, reputation, self-expression, and bodily integrity. Second, dignity
could be recognized as a background right to other rights. Third, dignity
190. Id. at 125-26.
191. Heinz Klug, The Dignity Clause of the Montana Constitution: May Foreign Jurisprudence
Lead the Way to an Expanded Interpretation?, 64 Mont. L. Rev. 133 (2003).
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could be recognized as a foundational principle, i.e. the right by which all
other rights are understood. Fourth, dignity could be recognized as a dis-
tinct, substantive constitutional right. Finally, dignity could be recognized
as both a right with independent, substantive content and one that serves as
an overarching principle to understand other constitutionally protected
rights.
The manifestation of a substantive right to dignity could limit criminal
sanctions-like the death penalty, life sentences, and juvenile discipline.
The right to dignity could preclude the use of lethal force in an attempt to
arrest a criminal, influence the development of rights to personhood and
equality, affect the right to information and freedom of expression, and en-
sure the right of access to a minimal amount of socio-economic resources.
Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and Future of
Montana's Environmental Provisions19 2 -Barton Thompson
This article explores the environmental provisions of the Montana
Constitution and the Montana Supreme Court's rulings in MEIC'93 and
Cape-Francel94 as unprecedented applications of strict scrutiny to environ-
mental policy disputes. Montana's constitutional provisions are considered
to be on the forefront of constitutional protections for the environment. The
Montana Constitution labels the "right to a clean and healthful environ-
ment" as an "inalienable" right, requires every citizen to protect the envi-
ronment, recognizes the environmental interests of "future generations" and
provides for the improvement of the environment.
In MEIC, the Montana Supreme Court concluded that the exemption
from non-degradation review of test wells that released arsenic-laced
groundwater into the Blackfoot River was a constitutional violation of
Montanans' fundamental right to a "clean and healthful" environment. In
Cape-France, the Montana Supreme Court refused to enforce a real estate
contract that required the landowner to drill a test well, which may have
released a toxic plume to an uncontaminated aquifer, because enforcing the
contract was not a compelling state interest to justify infringing Montanans'
fundamental right to a "clean and healthful" environment.
These developments in Montana Constitutional law provide environ-
mental lawyers unique authority to strengthen and expand Montana's envi-
ronmental laws. The Montana Supreme Court will have to consider eco-
nomic tradeoffs intrinsic to environmental policy disputes in future deci-
192. Barton Thompson, Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and Future of Montana's
Environmental Provisions, 64 Mont. L. Rev. 157 (2003).
193. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1999).
194. Cape-France Enters. v. Est. of Peed, 29 P.3d 1011 (Mont. 2001).
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sions. The Court might accomplish this by abandoning strict scrutiny,
redefining strict scrutiny to permit cost tradeoffs, substituting strict scrutiny
with balancing tests, or controlling its interpretation of the type of disputes
that trigger constitutional review.
The Challenge of "Differentiated Citizenship": Can State Constitutions
Protect Tribal Rights?195 -Rebecca Tsosie
Article X, § 1(2) of the Montana Constitution could help achieve jus-
tice for Indian and non-Indian people of Montana if its intent and potential
were more fully realized in the relationships between tribal and state gov-
ernments. The clause provides, the "state recognizes the distinct and unique
cultural heritage of the American Indians and is committed in its educa-
tional goals to the preservation of their cultural identity."1 96 Because the
provision has not been implemented consistently, its full potential has not
yet been achieved.
The history of the political, cultural, and educational status of Indians
and tribes has been unsteady and volatile in vision, funding, implementa-
tion, and cultural respect. However, the 1999 enactment of Montana House
Bill 528 holds promise for interactive relationships between tribes and the
State of Montana. House Bill 528, enacting Article X, § 1(2), encourages
Indians and non-Indians to engage in learning about the history, traditions,
and culture of American Indians. It particularly encourages local develop-
ment of learning curricula focused on nearby Indian tribes and their tradi-
tions.
Education of Indian heritage may lead to stronger relationships and
solutions to current and future conflicts between the State and tribes. Arti-
cle X, § 1(2) recognizes the importance of this heritage to contemporary
society. Principles of constitutionalism, pluralism and multiculturalism,
civic virtue, and fundamental rights supplement the full implementation of
Article X, § 1(2) to help structure future relationships, protect rights to edu-
cation and cultural integrity, and manifest the promise for a positive and
visionary relationship between Montana, Indian nations, and their citizens.
195. Rebecca Tsosie, The Challenge of "Differentiated Citizenship": Can State Constitutions
Protect Tribal Rights?, 64 Mont. L. Rev. 199 (2003).
196. Mont. Const. art. X, § 1(2).
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The Evolution of Montana's Privacy-Enhanced Search and Seizure
Analysis: A Return to First Principles 197-Melissa Harrison &
Peter Mickelson
This article contends that in about 1993 the Montana Supreme Court,
after an aberration in the mid-1980s, returned Montana's search and seizure
jurisprudence to a privacy enhanced analysis, which is more consistent with
the framers' intent and the case law immediately following the Constitu-
tional Convention. Article II, § 11 of the Montana Constitution tracks the
federal Constitution and prohibits warrantless searches and seizures. 198 Ar-
ticle II, § 10 guarantees Montanans' privacy rights. 199 Convention dele-
gates understood §§ 10 and 11 to be companion provisions that ensured
Montanans' right to be let alone.
In the early period, Montana courts adhered to some federal jurispru-
dence, but developed a purely independent privacy-based analysis for
search and seizure issues. In 1985, the Montana Supreme Court announced
that it was "not compelled to march lock-step with pronouncements of the
United States Supreme Court if our own constitutional provisions call for
more individual rights protection." 2 00 After this announcement, however,
the Montana Supreme Court distanced its search and seizure from the pri-
vacy guarantees of the Montana Constitution. However, beginning in the
early 1990's, the court returned to a privacy-enhanced analysis.
The article compares these three periods' treatment of the automobile,
search incident to arrest, and open fields exceptions, as well as surveillance
and standing doctrine. It concludes by suggesting the Montana Supreme
Court buttress its privacy-enhanced analysis in search and seizure cases
with the rich legislative history and intent that values expansion of individu-
als' privacy rights.
Technology's Future Impact on State Constitutional Law: The Montana
Example201-Mark Kende
This article discusses how technological advances in areas like bio-
technology, cyberspace, artificial intelligence, nano-technology, and cryon-
ics will affect Montana constitutional law. After tracing the history of
Montana constitutional law in the technology arena and the role of federal
197. Melissa Harrison & Peter Mickelson, The Evolution of Montana's Privacy-Enhanced Search
and Seizure Analysis: A Return to First Principles, 64 Mont. L. Rev. 245 (2003).
198. Mont. Const. art. H, § 10.
199. Id. at art II, § 11.
200. State v. Sierra, 692 P.2d 1273, 1276 (Mont. 1985).
201. Mark Kende, Technology's Future Impact on State Constitutional Law: The Montana Example,
64 Mont. L. Rev. 273 (2003).
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preemption, the article examines two cases that could confront the Montana
Supreme Court-a legislative ban on human cloning and an insurance com-
pany's unauthorized use of a person's genetic data to set health insurance
rates.
New technologies may give rise to novel and unforeseen controversies
that involve multiple parties and create complex situations that cannot be
neatly resolved by traditional constitutional review. For example, the rigid
categorical approaches to constitutional issues may not satisfactorily re-
solve a custody dispute over fertilized embryos in divorce proceedings
where multiple interests of several parties are involved. The author sug-
gests the Montana Supreme Court develop fact-specific balancing ap-
proaches for resolution of constitutional issues involving complex disputes
created by technological advancements.
The article also argues that the Montana Constitution's Privacy Clause
applies to non-government actors because the framers intended it be so, the
Clause's language is not limited to the government, public policy supports
such an interpretation, and the Montana Constitution's Dignity Clause
shows that citizens should be protected against non-governmental privacy
intrusions. For example, an insurance company would violate a person's
privacy by using the person's genetic data to set rates or a non-government
employer would violate an employee's privacy right by e-mail monitoring.
Taking Liberties: Analysis of In re Mental Health of K.G.F.202
Elaine M. Dahl
Involuntary civil commitment-the process by which the state obtains
a court order requiring a mentally ill person to stay at a facility or follow a
specific treatment program-raises constitutional issues concerning dignity,
a state's duty to protect society and individuals, and "medical-decision per-
sonal autonomy." In Mental Health of K.G.F.203 these issues were dis-
cussed in the context of a woman with "mixed rapid cycling bipolar disor-
der"-a disorder that causes a person's moods to rapidly alternate, often
causing her to experience mania and depression at once. It was in this con-
text that K.G.F., a suicidal woman, voluntarily admitted herself to a hospital
in Helena for treatment. During her stay at the hospital she became con-
cerned about her medication to the point that she refused to take her pre-
scribed medication, prompting a deputy county attorney to petition for her
involuntary commitment because she posed a threat to herself. The district
202. Elaine M. Dahl, Taking Liberties: Analysis of In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 64 Mont. L. Rev.
295 (2003).
203. In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001).
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court judge ordered her to be involuntarily committed to a community treat-
ment center. K.G.F. appealed the involuntary commitment.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court concluded that K.G.F.'s right
to dignity and autonomy must be balanced with the State's duty to protect
society and individuals; it remanded the case and ordered the district court
to conduct such an analysis. The Court unfortunately did not outline crite-
ria for the district court to use in balancing these rights. And as the author
suggests, "Only those who have experience with the mental health system
can fully understand the practical implications of ethereal debates about lib-
erty, autonomy, dignity, community, government, compassion, and under-
standing. Precisely because civil commitment raises issues about these core
values of society, it will remain a controversial subject." 2 0 4
The Slippery Definition of 'Marital Status' and Religious Organizations'
Free Reign to Discriminate, a Casenote on Parker-Bigback v.
St. Labre School 20 5-Edward T. LeClaire
This casenote discusses Parker-Bigback,206 a case concerning Mon-
tana's constitutional right to the free exercise of religion 207 and the right to
be free from discrimination.2 08 In the case, Parker-Bigback-an unmarried
former employee of St. Labre (a private Catholic school)-was fired after
her supervisor and priest found out that she was living with a man while
unmarried. St. Labre justified the firing with its expectation that school
employees act as Christian role models to its students, that such a living
situation is contrary to the doctrines and principles of the Catholic Church,
and that Parker-Bigback agreed to avoid such conduct in her employment
agreement with the school. Parker-Bigback filed a discrimination suit
under Montana Code Annotated § 49-2-303, which makes it unlawful for
employers to discriminate based on marital status. The district court ulti-
mately granted summary judgment to St. Labre-relying on the "free exer-
cise" clause of the First Amendment.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the decision, holding
that Parker-Bigback was not terminated because of her marital status but
because of her conduct-living, while unmarried, with a person of the op-
posite sex. Concluding that marital status was irrelevant to the termination,
the Court determined that the result would have been the same if Parker-
204. Dahl, supra n. 202, at 331.
205. Edward T. LeClaire, The Slippery Definition of 'Marital Status' and Religious Organizations'
Free Reign to Discriminate, a Casenote on Parker-Bigback v. St. Labre School, 64 Mont. L. Rev. 333
(2003).
206. Parker-Bigback v. St. Labre Sch., 7 P.3d 361 (Mont. 2000).
207. Mont. Const. art. II, § 5.
208. Id. at art. II, § 4.
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Bigback were married yet living with someone she was not married to. Re-
iterating the fact that Parker-Bigback agreed to avoid such conduct in her
employment contract, the Court affirmed the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment. The author questions the Court's reasoning, highlighting
the fact that "[i]n Montana, individuals are afforded more rights than under
the federal constitution. The jurisprudential analysis should reflect this dif-
ference." 2 0 9
Murky Waters: Private Action and the Right to a Clean and Healthful
Environment an Examination of Cape-France Enterprises v.
Estate of Peed210-Chase Naber
This article discusses the Montana Constitution's guarantee that (1) all
persons have an inalienable right to "a clean and healthful environment"21 1
and (2) "[t]he state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and
healthful environment in Montana for present and future generations."212
Cape-France213 was an action for specific performance of a buy-sell
agreement for real property in which the purchaser wanted to build a hotel
on the property. The concern was that perchlorethylene had been detected
in the Bozeman aquifer, and, as such, the Department of Environmental
Quality made annual sampling a condition for construction of the hotel.
Because three years passed and the deal was still pending, the purchasers
filed a motion for summary judgment seeking specific performance-
which, if granted, would force the seller to complete the procedures neces-
sary to finalize the transaction and construct the hotel.
The Montana Supreme Court ultimately rescinded the agreement, find-
ing that it exposed the public to potential health risks and potential environ-
mental degradation. However, as the author points out, in rescinding the
agreement the Court neglected to balance the public's right to a clean and
healthful environment with the permissible degradation related to economic
and social development-a requirement under MEIC.214
209. LeClaire, supra n. 205, at 353.
210. Chase Naber, Murky Waters: Private Action and the Right to a Clean and Healthful
Environment an Examination of Cape-France Enterprises v. Estate of Peed, 64 Mont. L. Rev. 357
(2003).
211. Mont. Const. art. H, § 3.
212. Id. at art. iX, § 1.
213. Cape-France Enters. v. Est. of Peed, 29 P.3d 1011 (Mont. 2001).
214. Mont. Enytl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1999).
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Indian Aboriginal and Reserved Water Rights, an Opportunity Lost2 15 -
John Carter
In this article the author argues that the drafters of the 1972 Montana
Constitution mistakenly ignored the federal doctrine of Indian reserved
water rights when they expanded the state constitutional provision on water
rights.216 The federal doctrine had existed for over 60 years when the Con-
stitutional Convention met in 1972. It directly conflicted with the constitu-
tional language proclaiming Montana as the owner of all waters in the State.
Carter argues there should have been an additional provision in Article
IX, § 3, recognizing Indian reserved rights. The drafters' failure to include
native water rights has resulted in numerous conflicts between the State of
Montana, tribes, private citizens, and the federal government. The recogni-
tion of Indian Tribes' water rights would have spared all parties repeated
litigation that has continually affirmed the dominance of federally protected
Indian reserved water rights over any state law claims.
Restoring Private to Privacy217-Jeffery T. Renz
This article argues that the Montana Supreme Court was incorrect in
limiting the constitutional right of privacy218 to circumstances of state ac-
tion. In State v. Long,219 the Court determined that the right to privacy
could not protect against private action because it specifically mentioned
state conduct and was silent with regard to private actors. However, prior
to the 1972 Constitution, there was a line of precedent protecting individual
privacy from both public and private actors. Additionally, the constitu-
tional debates and literature distributed to voters evidenced the drafters' in-
tent to constrain both the State and private citizens. As a result, the history
of Montana's right to privacy contradicts the Court's narrow interpretation
of its protective scope.
215. John Carter, Indian Aboriginal and Reserved Water Rights, an Opportunity Lost, 64 Mont. L.
Rev. 377 (2003).
216. Mont. Const. art. IX, § 3.
217. Jeffery T. Renz, Restoring Private to Privacy, 64 Mont. L. Rev. 385 (2003).
218. Mont. Const. art. II, § 10.
219. State v. Long, 726 P.2d 1364 (1986).
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Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational
Constitutional Discourse220-Vicki C. Jackson
This article explores the Human Dignity Clause221 of the Montana
Constitution in the context of trans-boundary influences. Montana's human
Dignity Clause was borrowed from the Puerto Rican Constitution. Puerto
Rico had been directly influenced by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the German Basic Law. The inclusion of this Clause in the
Montana Constitution demonstrated recognition that human dignity was
achieving the status of a fundamental value in the wake of World War II.
The Montana Supreme Court's treatment of the Dignity Clause illus-
trates the interaction between the new idea of human dignity and the ex-
isting paradigm of constitutional rights. Although international treatment of
human dignity has broadly recognized the right to encompass certain social
welfare commitments, Montana's Clause has not been interpreted this way.
Instead, it has been used to reinforce explicit rights including the prohibi-
tion of unlawful searches and seizures, protection from governmental dis-
crimination, and privacy.
Although the Montana Supreme Court has generally tacked its inter-
pretation of Article II, § 4 to the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal
Constitution, it has occasionally recognized the potential independence of
the Dignity Clause. Such expansive interpretations have occurred with re-
gard to polygraph tests, abortions, gender-bias, and cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. While it is unclear whether these small inroads on the discourse of
dignity are a harbinger of greater use in the future, the potential exists for
Montana to utilize transnational interpretation to develop a constitutional
concept of dignity.
The Death Penalty in Montana: A Violation of the Constitutional Right
to Individual Dignity222-Amanda K. Eklund
In this article the author argues that capital punishment is inhumane
and demeaning psychological torture that violates the dignity protections
guaranteed in the Montana Constitution.
First, the author identifies the Dignity Clause in the Montana Constitu-
tion and discusses how it has been interpreted and used. 2 2 3 The author then
supports her position by citing studies that suggest capital punishment is a
220. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational
Constitutional Discourse, 65 Mont. L. Rev. 15 (2004).
221. Mont. Const. art. 11, § 4.
222. Amanda K. Eklund, Student Author, The Death Penalty in Montana: A Violation of the
Constitutional Right to Individual Dignity, 65 Mont. L. Rev. 135 (2004).
223. Mont. Const. art. II, § 4.
2010 561
59
et al.: Articles on the Montana Constitution
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2010
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
racially biased institution. Further discussion focuses on the punishment as
extreme psychological torture and how the death penalty dehumanizes indi-
viduals forced to impose the sentence and those who perform the execution.
That the death penalty deprives a prisoner of his right to control what hap-
pens to his body is an additional reason presented in the argument that capi-
tal punishment violates Montana law.
International criticism has targeted the United States for its refusal to
abolish the death penalty. The author suggests that Montana should follow
the lead of the European and non-European countries that abolished the
death penalty. In Montana, the author argues, where individuals are guaran-
teed greater rights, the death penalty has no place.
It's Good to be the Game Warden: State v. Boyer and the Erosion of
Privacy Protection for Montana Sportsmen224
Malin J. Stearns
In this note, the author criticizes the legal analysis in State v. Boyer.
The author claims the Court eroded privacy protections and incorrectly im-
plicated environmental protections in the Montana Constitution.
According to the author, in State v. Boyer 2 2 5 the Montana Supreme
Court reasoned that society is not willing to accept that one has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the fish kept in a live well. Such an expectation
could lead to the unnecessary depletion of fish, a resource protected by the
Montana Constitution through the Clean and Healthful Environment
Clause. The Court also held that the game warden needed only particular-
ized suspicion to stop and board Boyer's boat.
Although the author believes the outcome of the case was likely cor-
rect, the author criticized the Court for not requiring game wardens to have
probable cause before boarding a boat and looking into a live well. The
author argues that the transom of the boat should be afforded constitutional
privacy protections. Additionally, the author argues that under Boyer,
"searches are justified by what wardens find, not by where or how they
conduct the search." 2 2 6 The analysis suggests that the holding unnecessa-
rily eroded privacy rights in Montana.
224. Malin J. Stearns, Student Author, It's Good to be the Game Warden: State v. Boyer and the
Erosion of Privacy Protection for Montana Sportsmen, 65 Mont. L. Rev. 187 (2004).
225. State v. Boyer, 42 P.3d 771 (Mont. 2002).
226. Id. at 213.
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Death with Dignity in Montana 22 7 -James E. Dallner & Scott Manning
In this article the authors discuss the right of doctors to give, and ter-
minally ill patients to receive, medical assistance in hastening death. The
authors begin by suggesting that medical and technological advancements
that prolong life shift our paradigm of dying and requires society and the
legal system to reconsider issues surrounding hastening death. Although
the authors admit that economics should not be the deciding factor in the
rights of the dying, they explain "new patterns in dying are not only more
prolonged, they are also far more costly."
While the United States Supreme Court has upheld the right of states
to prohibit assisted suicide, federal law does not prohibit a state from per-
mitting doctors to honor requests to medically hasten death. The authors
analyze Montana's Constitutional framework and point out that Montana
need not "walk lock step" with the federal government.
According to the authors, the right to dignity enumerated in the Mon-
tana Constitution qualifies the State's interest in preserving life and requires
the State to recognize and honor an individual's quality of life as it pertains
to individual conceptions of dignity. They suggest using Oregon's Death
with Dignity statute as a model to expand the Montana Rights of the Termi-
nally Ill Act.
Will Montana Breathe Life into its Positive Constitutional Right to Equal
Educational Opportunity ?228-Hillary A. Wandler
This article argues that, although the Montana Constitution mandates
educational quality and equality, these ideas remain an illusion. 22 9 Montana
courts have failed to define quality education, and the Legislature has
wrongly interpreted equality in education to only mean fiscal equality. Al-
though not everyone would agree on what equal educational opportunity
entails, the best approach is to also consider the distinct needs of different
schools and students.
The history of Montana's education system unfolds like a rol-
lercoaster, with both highs and lows. Even though the Montana Supreme
Court has previously held the State's system of funding public schools un-
constitutional, the Court has failed to provide any specific guidance on how
to resolve the problem. Thus, confusion persists regarding how to adminis-
ter the constitutional duties to provide both educational quality and equality.
227. James E. Dallner, Student Author, & Scott Manning, Death with Dignity in Montana, 65 Mont.
L. Rev. 309 (2004).
228. Hillary A. Wandler, Will Montana Breathe Life into its Positive Constitutional Right to Equal
Educational Opportunity?, 65 Mont. L. Rev. 343 (2004).
229. Mont. Const. art. X, § 1.
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Both New Jersey and Wyoming offer lessons and guidance on this
issue. Also, in order to remedy this problem, the Montana Supreme Court
must recognize that the Montana Constitution mandates dual duties regard-
ing education-quality and equality. Finally, any future educational fund-
ing scheme should be subject to periodic review, and must consider the
particular requirements of students, schools, and districts.
State v. Robinson: Free Speech, or Ichin' for a Fight?230 -
Thomas W. Korver
The author argues that the Montana Supreme Court incorrectly held in
State v. Robinson231 that insults spoken by the defendant to a police officer
constitute fighting words, and therefore the speech was not protected by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 232 Although the United
States Supreme Court has historically found the First Amendment is not an
absolute protection to all speech, the United States Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have applied the fighting words exception
more narrowly when the fighting words are spoken to a police officer.
Montana, however, incorrectly applies the exception broadly, even when
the speech is directed at a police officer.
The Robinson majority based its decision on factually distinguishable
and obsolete precedent. The Court missed an opportunity to base its deci-
sion on sound legal grounds. Further, the Court inappropriately seized the
written opinion as an opportunity to insult the defendant. Arguably, the
majority reached the right conclusion in terms of public policy. However,
the Court overreached its position by failing to follow United States Su-
preme Court precedent.
Toward a "Civil Gideon" Under the Montana Constitution: Parental
Rights as the Starting Point233-Mary Helen McNeal
This article argues that under the Administration of Justice Clause,234
the Dignity Clause, 235 and the Unenumerated Rights Clause 2 3 6 in the Mon-
tana Constitution, together with § 1-1-109 of the Montana Code Anno-
230. Thomas W. Korver, Student Author, State v. Robinson: Free Speech, or Ichin' for a Fight?, 65
Mont. L. Rev. 385 (2004).
231. State v. Robinson, 82 P.3d 27 (Mont. 2003).
232. U.S. Const. amend. I.
233. Mary Helen McNeal, Toward a "Civil Gideon" Under the Montana Constitution: Parental
Rights as the Starting Point, 66 Mont. L. Rev. 81 (2005).
234. Mont. Const. art. II, § 16.
235. Id. at art II, § 4.
236. Id. at art. II, § 34.
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tated,237 indigent litigants must, in some situations, be afforded free counsel
in civil proceedings. For example, where a fundamental right to parent is at
stake, the indigent litigant must be represented by counsel at all stages of a
proceeding.
Pursuant to the Montana Constitution, individuals have a fundamental
right to access the courts, but this right can be meaningless without the
assistance of counsel. This fundamental right works in tandem with the
Dignity Clause and right to parent. To deny an indigent litigant counsel
does injury to her dignity, especially when this effectively denies the liti-
gant meaningful access to the courts, and the individual's fitness as a parent
is being questioned.
While the Montana Supreme Court has ruled that indigent litigants be
represented in termination proceedings, the Court has refused to broaden
this rule to include pre-termination proceedings. However, the Court
should extend the rule in all phases of the process because the evidence
gathered during the pre-termination phase, during which the litigant is un-
represented, is used in later phases of the process. This rule should extend
to abuse, neglect, and custody disputes, as well, because these are situations
in which the fundamental right to parent is similarly at stake.
The War Against Arbitration in Montana238-Scott Burnham
The Montana Supreme Court's limitation of arbitration clauses is criti-
cally examined in this article in light of the Montana Constitution's protec-
tion of the rights of "pursuing life's basic necessities," "acquiring, possess-
ing, and protecting property," 239 access to the courts, 240 and trial by jury.
The rights to pursue life's necessities and deal in property would be mean-
ingless without freedom of contract. The Montana Supreme Court, through
its trilogy of Casarotto opinions, Iwen v. U.S. West Direct, and Keystone
Inc. v. Triad Systems Corp., has eliminated Montanans' "freedom to con-
tract to have their disputes resolved in another jurisdiction." 241 The Court
cited the constitutional protections of access to the courts and speedy reso-
lution in declining to enforce the forum selection clauses in those cases. 2 4 2
The Court finally won its war against arbitration in Kloss v. Edward
Jones & Co.,243 basing its decision primarily on the doctrine of reasonable
expectations. The Court enumerated several factors that it would consider
237. Mont. Code Ann. § 1-1-109 (2003).
238. Scott J. Burnham, War against Arbitration in Montana, 66 Mont. L. Rev. 139 (2005).
239. Mont. Const. art. II, § 3.
240. Id. at art. H, § 16.
241. Burnham, supra n. 238, at 184.
242. Iwen v. U.S. West Direct, 977 P.2d 989 (Mont. 1999).
243. Kloss v. Edward Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2002).
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in future cases when examining the enforceability of arbitration clauses.
The author questions whether it is even possible to draft an enforceable
arbitration clause given the Kloss factors. The article concludes by ques-
tioning the Court's extreme regulation-to the point of prohibition-of ar-
bitration clauses as paternalistic interference in Montanans' right to free-
dom of contract.
The Right to Participate and the Right to Know in Montana244
Fritz Snyder
The Montana Constitution's rather unique right to participate 2 4 5 and
right to know2 4 6 provisions are examined in this article. Both sections are
within the Constitution's Declaration of Rights. The right to participate
provides that the public has a right to participate in the operation of state
agencies prior to a final decision being reached, while the right to know
allows citizens to examine documents and observe deliberations of state
agencies except when the right to privacy clearly exceeds the public's right
to know. These Constitutional provisions allow Montana's citizens greater
access to state government decision-making than most other American citi-
zens enjoy, and the Montana Supreme Court has diligently protected these
provisions since their inception.
Montana's Marriage Amendment: Unconstitutionally Denying a
Fundamental Right2 4 7-Lisa M. Polk
This comment analyzes Montana's Marriage Amendment under the
14th Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, and argues
that the Amendment is unconstitutional under both. The Amendment was
passed in 2004 by CI-96, and it recognizes marriage only between one man
and one woman. 2 4 8 The United States Supreme Court has consistently held
marriage to be a fundamental right and recently defined marriage as a bene-
ficial societal institution that provides economic, legal, and social advan-
tages. Because this definition can be equally applied to heterosexual and
homosexual couples, there is no compelling state interest or rationale rea-
sonably related to a legitimate state interest preventing homosexual couples
from marrying. Thus, Montana's Marriage Amendment is unconstitutional
and should be repealed.
244. Fritz Snyder, The Right to Participate and the Right to Know in Montana, 66 Mont. L. Rev. 297
(2005).
245. Mont. Const. art. fl, § 8.
246. Id. at art. II, § 9.
247. Lisa M. Polk, Montana's Marriage Amendment: Unconstitutionally Denying a Fundamental
Right, 66 Mont. L. Rev. 405 (2005).
248. Mont. Const. art. XIII, § 7.
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A Battle of Public Goods: Montana's Clean and Healthful Environment
Provision and the School Trust Land Question249 -
Alex Sienkiewicz
This article explores the inherent tensions between the Montana Con-
stitution's guarantee of a "clean and healthful environment" 250 and the ad-
ministration of state trust lands. When Montana gained statehood in 1889,
the United States granted it more than 5 million acres of state trust lands for
the purpose of supporting public institutions, such as schools and universi-
ties, through revenue generation. Revenue is generated through timber har-
vesting, grazing and farming leases, recreational use, commercial develop-
ment, and land sales and exchanges, among other means. Montana's public
education system is heavily dependent on this revenue.
Tensions arise between the administration of state trust lands and the
right to a clean and healthful environment when the lands are administered
for the sole purpose of generating revenue. In order to maintain a free,
quality public education system (which is also guaranteed by the Montana
Constitution 251), the Land Board, which administers the land, might be
forced to make short-sighted decisions that maximize revenue but simulta-
neously undermine the ecological value of the land (e.g., unsustainable tim-
ber harvesting). The mandate to generate sufficient funds for public educa-
tion might override the fundamental right to a clean and healthful environ-
ment. The author argues new legislation is needed to ensure that state land
trusts are providing adequate revenue while preserving Montanans' right to
a clean and healthful environment.
Keynote Address: The Right to Privacy252-JUstice James C. Nelson
This annotated transcript of Justice Nelson's keynote address sets the
stage for the Montana Law Review's Honorable James R. Browning Sym-
posium on the right to privacy (held October 11-13, 2006). Justice Nelson
described a variety of ways in which Montanan's right to privacy-guaran-
teed by the Montana Constitution2 5 3-iS under attack. Whether that right is
threatened by legislation aimed to curb terrorism or searches made possible
by new technologies, Montanans must fiercely guard their constitutional
Right to Privacy. Justice Nelson's address concludes with highlights of
speakers and panelists who presented at the Symposium.
249. Alex Sienkiewicz, A Battle of Public Goods: Montana's Clean and Healthful Environment
Provision and the School Trust Land Question, 67 Mont. L. Rev. 65 (2006).
250. Mont. Const. art. I, § 3.
251. Id. at art. X, § 1.
252. Justice James C. Nelson, Keynote Address: The Right to Privacy, 68 Mont. L. Rev. 257 (2007).
253. Mont. Const. art. n, § 10.
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Privacy and Dignity at the End of Life: Protecting the Right of
Montanans to Choose Aid in Dying 254-Kathryn Tucker
This article asks whether the Montana Supreme Court would (and
should) recognize a right to receive aid in dying under the Montana Consti-
tution. The author begins by asking whether state versions of the landmark
federal cases Vacco v. Quil2 55 and Washington v. Glucksberg256 would suc-
ceed if brought before the Montana Supreme Court. For a number of rea-
sons, the author argues the Montana Supreme Court would uphold the right
to receive aid in dying. First, as illustrated in the Montana Supreme Court's
analysis of the State's constitutional right to privacy, protection under the
State Constitution is more sweeping than that of the United States Constitu-
tion. Second, Oregon's Death with Dignity Act2 57-the only act of its kind
in 2007-might provide a viable framework to implement the right to re-
ceive aid in dying. Third, Americans, now more than ever, are accepting
that individuals should be permitted to make end-of-life choices if they suf-
fer from an incurable disease. Finally, and more specifically, pain and
symptom management have been important issues for Montana's State gov-
ernment and private health care organizations. While the federal govern-
ment has not recognized the right to receive aid in dying, Montana could be
in a unique position to recognize this right.
Bespeaking Justice: A History of Indigent Defense in Montana258 -
James Park Taylor
This article explores the history of the right to counsel granted to the
criminally accused under the Montana Constitution.259 While the language
of the constitutional guarantee has remained unchanged since Montana
adopted its original Constitution in 1889, the Legislature's ability to effec-
tively provide that right to indigent adult defendants has varied greatly. In
this regard, the most difficult issue has always been finding an adequate
source to fund such representation. For years, Montana was notorious for
its inadequate provision of public defense; however, the Montana Public
254. Kathryn Tucker, Privacy and Dignity at the End of Life: Protecting the Right of Montanans to
Choose Aid in Dying, 68 Mont. L. Rev. 317 (Mont. 2007).
255. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (as the author notes, "holding that the right to assistance in
committing suicide was not a fundamental liberty interest in and that the State of Washington's ban on
assisted suicide was rationally related to several governmental interests").
256. Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (as the author notes, "holding that the right to assis-
tance in committing suicide was not a fundamental liberty interest and that the State of Washington's
ban on assisted suicide was rationally related to several governmental interests).
257. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 127.800-127.897 (West 2005).
258. James Park Taylor, Bespeaking Justice: A History of Indigent Defense in Montana, 68 Mont. L.
Rev. 363 (2007).
259. Mont. Const. art. II, § 24.
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Defender Act, which was enacted in 2005, is considered one of the nation's
most forward-looking pieces of indigent defense legislation.260
The Right to Participate, The Right to Know, and Electronic Voting in
Montana26 '-Brian J. Miller
This article explores the possibility that provisions of the Montana
Constitution could provide Montana residents with the opportunity to dis-
cover sensitive information regarding the operation of electronic voting ma-
chines. Many jurisdictions have begun using electronic machines to
streamline the voting process and increase public confidence in voting re-
sults. However, a number of suspicious election and testing results have
caused many to question the accuracy of these machines as well as their
vulnerability to hacking and election fraud. Unfortunately, most of these
machines are designed and developed by private companies, and trade se-
cret laws have prevented the public from discovering how the software and
source code installed on these machines actually counts the votes.
Montana uses electronic voting machines manufactured by Election
Systems & Software, Inc., the same company whose machines have come
under scrutiny in other jurisdictions. If such a controversy were to arise in
Montana, the right to participate 2 6 2 and right to know 2 6 3 guaranteed to citi-
zens under the Montana Constitution may provide means for Montanans to
defeat a trade secrets defense and compel production of software and source
code information. Generally, in combination, the right to participate and
right to know maximize citizen access to, and knowledge regarding, gov-
ernment decision making. If these provisions could be used to obtain public
disclosure of proprietary information like voting machine software and
source code, the electronic voting process in Montana could be safeguarded
and improved.
A Historical Perspective on Montana Property Tax: 25 Years of
Statewide Appraisal and Appeal Practice264-Karen E. Powell
This article examines the complexity and effectiveness of Montana's
unique property tax system which was dramatically changed by the 1972
Montana Constitution. Unlike the prior system instituted by the 1889 Con-
260. Mont. Code Ann. § 47-1-101 et. seq. (2009).
261. Brian J. Miller, The Right to Participate, The Right to Know, and Electronic Voting in
Montana, 69 Mont. L. Rev 371 (2008).
262. Mont. Const. art. I, § 8.
263. id. at art. H, § 9.
264. Karen E. Powell, A Historical Perspective on Montana Property Tax: 25 Years of Statewide
Appraisal and Appeal Practice, 70 Mont. L. Rev. 21 (2009).
2010 569
67
et al.: Articles on the Montana Constitution
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2010
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
stitution, the state is now charged with oversight of property appraisal for
tax purposes.265 This change, which was prompted by concerns about the
inequality of local appraisals, made Montana only the second state to utilize
a statewide appraisal system. The 1972 Constitution also directed the Leg-
islature to provide an independent appeal procedure for "taxpayer griev-
ances about appraisals, assessments, equalization, and taxes." 2 6 6
While the revisions in the 1972 Constitution were intended to equalize
property valuation and provide taxpayers with an adequate avenue to appeal
valuation decisions, the current property tax system has proved complex
and inefficient. Montana currently utilizes a unique six-year reappraisal cy-
cle. This long appraisal cycle increases the likelihood that property values
will substantially change with each cycle and limits the opportunity taxpay-
ers have to appeal valuation increases. Despite the limited opportunity to
dispute valuation increases, the system does allow for numerous levels of
appellate review and the Montana Supreme Court has frequently remedied
disproportionate tax burdens on uniformity, equal protection, and due pro-
cess grounds. While a simpler system with a shorter appraisal cycle would
likely remedy a number of current problems, the Montana Department of
Revenue does not currently have the resources to appraise land on an an-
nual or biennial basis.
265. Mont. Const. art. VBI, § 3.
266. Id. at art. VIII, § 7.
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